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I.
INTRODUCTION
It should be no news by now that the credit rating indus-
try is plagued by conflicts of interest. Credit rating agencies
* Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. The au-
thor thanks Adam Bennett, Hongjun Wang and Jing Zhang for their valua-
ble research assistance. The author is responsible for all mistakes.
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have been rating the debts issued or underwritten by affiliated
entities, or entities that have recently retained those rating
agencies' help in structuring debts for the purpose of enhanc-
ing credit ratings. Moreover, for decades the rating agencies
have relied heavily on the fees paid by the entities subject to
their ratings in order to sustain their rating business. The
rated entities have been given an upper hand in the bargain
because they are free to walk away, without paying, from a pre-
liminary rating that does not meet their lofty expectations.1
The pressure on the rating agencies to assign ratings that
please their clients sows the seeds for conflicts of interest and
for the ensuing problems in a financial market that relies heav-
ily on the accuracy of credit ratings.
Credit rating agencies have been in the spotlight since the
Enron scandal in the early 2000s, when they delivered invest-
ment grade ratings only days before the firm went bankrupt.
2
They did not become household names, however, until the
subprime mortgage debacle in 2007 that triggered the finan-
cial market meltdown from which the global economy is yet to
recover. Rating agencies gave triple-A ratings to 75% of the
$3.2 trillion subprime mortgages that lost sizable value only
months after the ratings were made.
3
Not surprisingly, regulations on credit rating agencies
tightened. The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 was
enacted, 4 followed by the rules of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC") in June 2007.5 In the short span of
1. For an in-depth discussion of the conflicts of interest problems in the
credit rating industry, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE ROLE
AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURI-
TIES MARKETS (2003) [hereinafter SEC Report of 2003], available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport003.pdf.
2. See Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Running on Empty: Enron
Faces Collapse as Credit, Stock Dive and Dynegy Bolts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001,
at Al.
3. See David Evans & Caroline Salas, Credit Rating Agencies on Trial -
Weren't They Supposed to Spot This?, N.Z. HERALD (Jun. 8, 2009), http://www
.nzherald.co.nz/management/news/article.cfm?c_id=59&objectid=105765
.90. See also Elliot Blair Smith, 'Race To Bottom' at Moody's, S&P Secured Sub-
prime's Boom, Bust, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.bloomberg
.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=ax3vfya_ Vtdo.
4. See infra note 8.
5. See Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Rec-
ognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal and Law & Business
(Vol. 7:47
HeinOnline -- 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 48 2010
PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURES
the two years afterwards, the SEC issued more than ten re-
leases to propose and eventually adopt two more sets of rule
changes.6 At the legislative level, the Wall Street and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2010, popularly referred to as finan-
cial market overhaul bill or the Dodd-Frank Bill, was signed
into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010. This statute fur-
ther enhances credit rating agency regulation by introducing
key changes, such as removing the immunity from liabilities
that the industry has long enjoyed for even gross negligence in
their ratings.
7
Though regulatory efforts toward reform are ongoing, the
rating industry's issuer-pay business model is difficult to
change. Under this system, revenues paid by issuers provide
rating agencies with the financial resources to rate a wide
range of debt issues. But the scope of coverage is destined to
55857, 72 Fed. Reg. 33,563 (Jun. 12, 2007) [hereinafter June 2007 Adopting
Release].
6. See Security Ratings, 73 Fed. Reg. 40 (proposed Jul. 1, 2008) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 239-40); References to Ratings of Nation-
ally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,124 (pro-
posedJul. 1, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 275); References to
Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed.
Reg. 40,088 (proposed Jul. 1, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
242); Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Or-
ganizations, 74 Fed. Reg. 6456 (Feb. 2, 2009) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts.
240, 249(b)) [hereinafter Feb. 2009 Adopting Release]; Re-proposed Rules
for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg.
6485 (proposed Feb 2, 2009) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 240, 243); Refer-
ences to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
74 Fed. Reg. 52,358 (Oct. 5, 2009) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 240, 242,
249, 270); References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,374 (proposed Oct. 5, 2009) (to be codified
at C.F.R. pts. 229-30, 239-40, 242, 249, 270, 275); Credit Ratings Disclosure,
74 Fed. Reg. 53086 (proposed Oct. 7, 2009) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts.
229, 239-40, 249, 274); Concept Release on Possible Rescission of Rule
4 36 (g) under the Securities Act of 1933, 74 Fed. Reg. 53114 (proposed Oct.
7, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 220); Amendments to Rules for
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832
(Nov. 23, 2009) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 240, 243) [hereinafter Nov.
2009 Adopting Release]; Proposed Rules For Nationally Recognized Statisti-
cal Rating Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. 63866 (proposed Dec 4, 2009) (to be
codified at C.F.R. pts. 240, 249(b).
7. For a summary of key provisions on credit rating agencies in this leg-
islation, see Wall Street Reform: Credit Rating Agencies, AM. FOR FIN. REFORM,
June 30, 2010, http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2010/06/what-happened-on-
wall-street-reform-credit-rating-agencies/#.
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dwindle if rating agencies must rely on alternative (and re-
duced) revenue sources such as rating subscriptions and debt
consulting services. Other informational values of credit rat-
ings will also be lost.
8
In May 2010, Senator Al Franken from Minnesota pro-
posed the establishment of a rating board to dispatch rating
assignments to agencies of its choice based on the agencies'
performance record (the "Franken Proposal"). The proposal
was eliminated from the final version of the financial market
overhaul bill due to concern that the effects of such a funda-
mental change had not been closely studied.9 However, Con-
gress has mandated that the SEC further study the conflicts of
interest issue before reconsidering the Franken Proposal in
two years. 10 Credit rating agency regulation remains at the top
of the SEC's agenda.
This paper examines the effectiveness of an important
part of the credit rating agency regulation: the performance
disclosure requirements that were introduced by the SEC in
200711 and strengthened in 2009.12 Under these regulations,
credit rating agencies are required to disclose their historical
8. For a discussion on how credit ratings help institutional investors se-
lect financial assets, see Approaches To Improving Credit Rating Agency Regula-
tion: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored En-
ters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 2-3 (2009) (testimony of
Gregory W. Smith, Colo. Pub. Employees' Ret. Ass'n), available at http://
www.house.gov/apps/list/heaing/financialsvcs-dem/gregoryw_smith-
testimony.pdf.
9. An excerpt of Senator Dodd's speech on the floor of the Senate on
May 13, 2010 states: "My colleague from Minnesota has what I think is a very
sound and good idea. Here are my concerns .... I don't know what the
implications are. Not all the rating agencies are equal. I think there ought to
be more of them. I think there a lot of smaller one [sic] out there that out
[sic] to grow in their competency and do things differently. But there are
different companies of different sizes and needs, and to be choosing rating
agencies based on arbitrary choice without considering whether or not the
rating agency can actually do the job is my concern." Michael Corkery,
Credit Rating Smackdown: Franken v. Dodd, WSJ BLOcS DEALJ. (May 14, 2010,
11:09 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2O10/05/ 14/credit-raters-take-
heart-chris-dodd-to-the-rescue/.
10. See David M. Herszenhorn, House-Senate Talks Drop New Credit-Rating
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/
business/i 6regulate.html.
11. See June 2007 Adopting Release, supra note 5.
12. See Feb. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6; Nov. 2009 Adopting
Release, supra note 6.
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rating transitions and default rates when they register with the
SEC as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization
("NRSRO") and to update those disclosures on an annual ba-
sis. Credit rating agencies are also required to publish on their
websites a random sample of ten percent of issuer-paid ratings
and their complete history for each rating category, as well as
to disclose all ratings (issuer-paid or unsolicited) that have oc-
curred since June 26, 2007.
The purposes of these disclosure requirements are two-
fold. First, they enhance the reputational cost to rating agen-
cies that engage in inappropriate rating actions. Second, they
help break the entry barrier for smaller rating agencies with
strong performance records in a market that is dominated by
certain established names, namely Moody's Investors Service,
Inc. ("Moody's"), Standard & Poor's Rating Services ("Stan-
dard & Poor's"), and to some extent, Fitch, Inc. ("Fitch").1
3
Credit rating agencies claim that their reputation is their
biggest asset, and that it would not serve the agencies' best
interest to risk losing that asset by giving in to the pressure of a
small number of clients.14 Indeed, there is some evidence that
the concern for reputational damage does deter inappropriate
rating actions. 15 Thus, it is plausible for the current regulation
to enlist the help of reputational sanctions through perform-
ance disclosures in policing credit rating agencies' behaviors.
But are the disclosures in their current forms capable of ac-
complishing their mission? In other words, will debt issuers
and the investment community use the information embed-
ded in these disclosures in selecting agencies for their debt
ratings? If the answer is no, then performance disclosures, no
matter how elaborate, will not sanction or enhance credit rat-
ing agencies' reputations, and they will not be as effective as
the SEC has hoped for as a tool to combat conflicts of interest.
Instead, disclosures would simply drain the financial resources
13. See infra notes 55, 64, and 70.
14. See THE TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, RE-
PORT OF THE AcrVITIES OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, (Sept. 2003), http://
www.fsa.gojp/inter/ios/20030930/05.pdf.
15. See Daniel M. Covitz & Paul Harrison, TESTING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
AT BOND RATING AGENCIES WITH MARKET ANTICIPATION: Evidence that Reputa-
tion Incentives Dominate, Fed. Res. (Dec. 2003), http://www.federaireserve.
gov/pubs/feds/2003/200368/200368pap.pdf.
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of the credit rating industry due to their implementation
costS.
1 6
The answer to this question is not at all apparent. The
current regulation does not require uniformity in the data, so
there will be differences in rating category designations and
even rating symbols among rating agencies. For example,
debts issued by regional government agencies might be classi-
fied as government securities by one agency but as corporate
debt by another. One rating agency may use the symbol "D" to
indicate the occurrence of default while another may use a dif-
ferent symbol for the same purpose. The eXtensible Business
Reporting Language ("XBRL") format in which the rating ac-
tions data are reported has made data downloading easier, but
in order to compare the performance statistics one must sort
out the numerous inconsistencies between different agencies'
data. Given the large volumes of data on historical rating ac-
tions - for instance, there are 463,061 Excel rows and 17 vari-
ables in Moody's ten-percent rating sample alone - and the
amount of manual processing required to collate data into
consistent forms, comparing performance measurements of
multiple credit rating agencies is a tedious and laborious pro-
cess. 17 Will debt issuers indeed judiciously analyze the data in
order to identify a top performing agency for its next rating
assignment, or will they simply choose a firm that is generally
well-regarded in the industry because such a choice is easiest
to justify and involves the least amount of effort?
Despite their importance, the effects of rating agencies'
performance disclosures have never been studied. This paper
intends to fill this void by examining the relationship between
key performance metrics and the volume of rating assign-
ments received by rating agencies during the period of 2000-
2009. Although performance disclosures were only recently
added to credit rating agency regulations, data items subject to
these reporting requirements have been collected (and sold
for profit) by data vendors, such as Bloomberg, since the
1990s. Almost every financial institution subscribes to Bloom-
16. For the SEC's discussion on anticipated costs for implementing the
disclosure requirements, see Feb. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6, at 63-
64; Nov. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6, at 101-02.
17. For a detailed discussion on the inconsistencies in the performance
disclosure, see infra II.B.3.
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berg, and these institutions function as advisors to corpora-
tions and sovereigns that issue debts.18 Moreover, the Bloom-
berg data are readily downloadable into Excel so that they can
be sorted and analyzed according to the needs of their users.19
In other words, information that is available to debt issuers
now pursuant to SEC performance disclosure requirements
has long been accessible by them at least indirectly through
their financial advisors. This long-standing accessibility makes
it possible for this study to examine the past relationship be-
tween disclosures and market shares in the credit rating indus-
try and to assess how effectively the new disclosure regulations
function as reputational sanctions on credit rating agencies'
inappropriate behavior.
The importance of this study extends beyond the borders
of the credit rating industry. The SEC is in the process of im-
plementing a new regulation that requires all companies
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act") to provide their financial statements to the SEC and to
post them on the company website, both in an interactive data
format using XBRL. 20 An important goal of this new regula-
tion is to allow the investing public to compare financial and
business performances across companies, reporting periods,
and industries. 21 Similar regulatory initiatives are also present
in financial institution and mutual fund reporting. 22 Will the
disclosures result in higher scrutiny of the reporting compa-
nies' performance measurements? Will they help the investing
public make investment choices based on the merits of the re-
porting companies? The results of this paper can be a valuable
18. For a detailed discussion of the Bloomberg data and the company's
service to financial institutions, see its internet webpage http://www.bloom-
berg.com/about/. See also Joshua Kennon, What Is a Bloomberg Terminal or
Bloomberg Machine? The Tool of Choice for Serious Professional Investors, http://
beginnersinvest.about.com/od/research/qt/bloomberg.htm.
19. Such information can be retrieved by using the "RATI" and "RATC"
functions inside a Bloomberg terminal.
20. See SEC Interactive Data to Improve Financial Reporting, 17 C.F.R.
§§229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249 (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-9002.pdf.
21. Id. at 8.
22. Id. at 17. See also Interactive Data for Mutual Fund Risk/Return Sum-
mary, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-28617, 2009 SEC LEXIS 587
(Feb. 11, 2009).
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reference point for the SEC in answering these important
questions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Part II discusses
the framework of the credit rating agency regulation and the
new performance reporting requirements, highlights the in-
consistency problem in disclosures materials, and assesses the
effects of the disclosures in light of findings in cognitive sci-
ence and consumer choice research. Part III discusses the
data, empirical methodology, and results of this study. Part IV
discusses the regulatory implications from the results of this
study and makes recommendations on how the current regula-
tion on credit rating agencies' performance disclosures should
be improved. Part V concludes this paper.
II.
THE PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURES OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
A. An Overview of Credit Rating Agency Regulations
In the United States, credit rating agencies were largely
unregulated until the enactment of the Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006.23 This statute created a new section - Sec-
tion 15E under the Exchange Act - that established a regula-
tory framework for a registration and recognition process to
which rating agencies must adhere in order to hold the NR-
SRO status. This statute provides guidelines under which the
SEC is mandated to adopt and implement detailed rules on
NRSRO recognition conditions and registration procedures. 24
Pursuant to the authority granted by the Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act of 2006, the SEC adopted detailed rules on
NRSRO recognition conditions and registration procedures in
23. Prior to the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, the term "NRSRO"
was initially adopted in 1975 solely for determining capital charges on differ-
ent grades of debt securities under the Securities Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1.
24. The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act requires an NRSRO to estab-
lish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures to address con-
flicts of interest; to provide required information, including any conflict of
interest relating to the issuance of credit rating by the rating agency, to the
SEC upon filing the registration statement by the rating agency for its NR-
SRO recognition; and to update information contained in the initial regis-
tration statement on an annual basis. The statute also grants the SEC the
authority to revoke the registration of any NRSRO that fails to maintain "ad-
equate financial and managerial resources to consistently produce credit rat-
ings with integrity." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E.
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June 2007.25 In 2009, the SEC adopted a series of regulatory
changes to further enhance the transparency of rating meth-
odologies and performances and to strengthen NRSROs' re-
cordkeeping and reporting obligations, in order to assist the
SEC in monitoring NRSROs' compliance with regulation.
26
The SEC rules have targeted conflicts of interest at both
the rating analyst level and the rating agency level. The con-
flicts at the analyst level arise mainly from analysts' owning the
securities subject to their rating, holding directorship or em-
ployment positions at the rated entities, maintaining special
personal or business relationship with the rated entities (for
example, having an immediate family member who works at a
rated entity), receiving gifts from the rated entities, and being
compensated based on the rating fees that they help generate
for the rating agencies that employ them.27 The conflicts at
the agency level arise mainly from rating agencies' receiving
compensation for their ratings from the rated entities, provid-
ing consulting and other ancillary services to the rated entities,
rating securities issued or underwritten by affiliated entities,
and receiving subscription fees from financial institutions
whose asset portfolios include securities subject to the rating
agencies' ratings.
2 8
Key regulations targeting conflicts at the analyst level in-
clude: (1) Prohibiting a credit rating agency from issuing a
credit rating where either the agency or its employees directly
involved in the rating process owns the securities of the rated
entity.29 (2) Prohibiting a credit rating agency from issuing
credit ratings with regard to an entity if a person directly in-
volved in the rating process is an officer or director of the
rated entity. 30 (3) Requiring credit rating agencies to establish
internal rules to address conflicts of interest arising from their
employees' special personal or business relationship with a
25. SeeJune 2007 Adopting Release, supra note 5.
26. See Feb. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6; Oct. 2009 Adopting
Release, supra note 6; Nov. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6.
27. For a detailed discussion of the sources of conflicts of interest at both
the rating analyst level and the rating agency level, see Lynn Bai, On Regulat-
ing Conflict of Interest in the Credit Rating Industy, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 253, 260 (2010).
28. Id.
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c) (2) (2009).
30. § 240.17g-5(c) (4 ).
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rated entity, although there is no outright prohibition in the
SEC Rules against a credit rating agency issuing credit ratings
when such conflicts exist. 31 (4) Prohibiting a credit rating
agency from issuing credit ratings if a person directly involved
in the rating process has received gifts from the rated entity
that have an aggregate value of more than $25.32
Major provisions targeting conflicts of interest at the rat-
ing agency level include: (1) Prohibiting credit rating agencies
from issuing credit ratings on securities issued or underwritten
by an affiliated entity (i.e., a company directly or indirectly
controlling, controlled by, or under the common control with,
the rating agency). 3 (2) Prohibiting a credit rating agency
from issuing credit ratings with regard to an entity for which
the agency made recommendations about the corporate or le-
gal structure, assets, liabilities, or activities of the entity.34 (3)
Prohibiting a credit rating agency from threatening to issue
unfavorable ratings on the condition that the issuer subject to
such ratings purchase ancillary services from the rating
agency. 35 (4) Prohibiting a credit rating agency from issuing a
credit rating where the person soliciting the credit rating was
the source of ten percent or more of the total net revenue of
the credit rating agency during the most recently ended fiscal
year.36 (5) Prohibiting a person directly involved in the credit
rating process from participating in the negotiation or discus-
sion of fees paid for the provision of the credit rating.
3 7
In addition to the above provisions that directly address
the concern of conflicts of interest, the Credit Rating Agency
31. § 240.17g-5(b) (7).
32. § 240.17g-5(c)( 7 ).
33. § 240.17g-5(c) (3).
34. § 240.17g-5(c) (5).
35. Exchange Act Rule 17g-6(a) (2) prohibits an NRSRO from issuing, or
offering or threatening to issue, a credit rating that is not determined in
accordance with the NRSRO's established procedures for determining credit
ratings, but is based on whether the rated person purchases or will purchase
the credit rating or another product or service. Exchange Act Rule l 7g-
6(a) (3) prohibits an NRSRO from modifying, or offering or threatening to
modify, a credit rating in a manner contrary to its procedures for modifying
a credit rating based on whether the rated person, or an affiliate of the rated
person, purchases or will purchase the credit rating or any other service or
product of the NRSRO and its affiliates. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-6(a) (2009).
36. § 240.17g-5(c) (1).
37. § 240.17g-5(c) (6).
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Reform Act and SEC rules also include extensive record-keep-
ing requirements intended to help the SEC staff identify possi-
ble inappropriate rating actions. The records must be kept for
at least three years after they are made or received. 38 Key re-
cord-keeping requirements are: (1) A credit rating agency
must disclose in its initial and updated Form NRSRO twenty
largest clients (i.e., issuers, underwriters and subscribers) in
terms of their net revenue contributions to the credit rating
agency in the preceding fiscal year.3 9 (2) A credit rating
agency must retain records of the original entries of informa-
tion that feeds into its financial reports, 40 and an account re-
cord for each fee-paying client.4 1 (3) A credit rating agency
must retain any internal records used to form the basis of a
credit rating, including nonpublic information and work pa-
pers such as the raw results of a quantitative credit rating
model and notes of conversations with the management of an
issuer that was the subject of the credit rating.42 (4) A credit
rating agency must retain a record of any external and internal
communications (including emails received and sent by the
credit rating agency and its employees that relate to credit rat-
ings) ' 43 and any document relating to the credit rating
agency's internal audit plans, reports, follow-up measures, and
all records identified by the internal auditors as necessary to
perform the internal audits.44 (5) A credit rating agency must
retain a record of any written complaints from a person not
associated with the credit rating agency about the perform-
ance of a credit analyst in regard to a credit rating. 45 (6) A
credit rating agency must retain a record of the identity of any
personnel that participated in the determination or approval
of the credit rating, the dates of rating actions, with a notation




39. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a) (1) (B) (viii).
40. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2(a)(1) (2009).
41. § 240.17g-2(a) (3).
42. § 240.17g-2(b) (2).
43. § 240.17g-2(b) (7).
44. § 240.17g-2(b) (5).
45. § 240.17g-2(b) (8).
46. § 240.17g-2(a) (2).
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There are additional record keeping provisions for struc-
tured finance ratings. Under those provisions, a credit rating
agency is required to document reasons when a final credit
rating materially deviates from the rating implied by a quanti-
tative model if the model is a substantial component of the
rating process. 47 Moreover, a credit rating agency that rates a
structured finance product must provide on its website infor-
mation pertinent to its rating to other rating agencies who
have not been hired to rate the product. This disclosure re-
quirement intends to promote unsolicited ratings by multiple
rating agencies and thus increase the likelihood of detecting
inappropriate rating inflations by the rating agency that is
hired by the issuer to provide the rating.48
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act and the SEC rules
also contain important provisions that promote transparency
in the credit rating process. Under these regulations, an appli-
cation for registration as an NRSRO must contain information
regarding the procedures and methodologies used by the
credit rating agency to determine credit ratings.49 Moreover,
such disclosures must be sufficiently detailed to provide users
of credit ratings with an understanding of the process the ap-
plicant or the NRSRO uses in determining credit ratings. 50
Finally, the SEC rules require credit rating agencies to
make available to the public their historical rating actions and
performance statistics so that investors can form an indepen-
dent opinion of the rating quality of particular agencies and
make industry-wide comparisons of rating agencies' perform-
ance. The next section discusses those performance disclo-
sures in detail.
47. § 240.17g-2(a) (2). Credit rating agencies expressed concern over the
possibility that the rule could lead to the overemphasis of quantitative mod-
els at the expense of applying qualitative factors. Partly due to these com-
ments, the SEC has narrowed the application of the rule to ratings of struc-
tured finance products. See Feb. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6, at
6471.
48. See Nov. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 26, at 63,844.
49. See Exchange Act §15E(a)(1)(B)(ii) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006)).
50. See [Application for Registration as a Nationally Recognized Statisti-
cal Rating Organization (Form NRSRO)], http://www.sec.gov/ about/forms/
formnrsro.pdf (last updated Apr. 2009).
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B. The Performance Disclosure Requirements
There are three main components to the regulations on
performance disclosures of credit rating agencies: the disclo-
sure of rating transition and default rates, the disclosure of
ten-percent of issuer-paid ratings for all rating sectors in the
entire history of a credit rating agency's operation (hereinaf-
ter, "Ten-Percent Rating Sample"), and the disclosure of all
ratings (whether issuer-paid or unsolicited) for all rating sec-
tors since June 26, 2007 (hereinafter, "Complete Record Since
June 2007"). This section discusses each of these components
in detail.
1. Rating Transitions and Default Rates
Credit rating agencies which apply for the NRSRO status
must disclose in Exhibit 1 of Form NRSRO performance mea-
surement statistics over one, three, and ten-year periods up to
the most recent calendar year-end. 51 The disclosure must re-
veal historical ratings transition and default rates within each
rating category, notch, or grade used by the NRSRO. 52 The
default statistics must include defaults relative to the initial rat-
ing.53 Instructions to Exhibit 1 of Form NRSRO also require
NRSROs to describe how they derive their statistics in suffi-
cient detail so that viewers can understand the measures. The
instructions do not identify any other particular performance
statistics that must be disclosed. Moreover, the SEC rules have
not imposed any standardization requirements with regard to
the performance statistics disclosed in Exhibit 1.
5 4
The performance disclosures are intended to allow users
to compare the quality of different credit rating agencies and
to enhance competition by making it easier for smaller agen-
cies to develop proven track records so they can break through
the entry barriers in an industry that is dominated by brand
names.
55
Credit rating agencies typically disclose rating transitions
through matrices that show migrations of ratings from one





55. June 2007 Adopting Release, supra note 5 at 46.
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trate how a transition matrix highlights a credit rating agency's
performance, Table 1 reproduces a Moody's transition matrix
for corporate issuers included in its 2010 annual certification
document.
56
TABLE 1 SAMPLE TRANSITION MATRIX
CORPORATE ISSUERS
FROM/TO: Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B CaaC WR
Aaa 86.42% 7.79% 1.00% 0.03% 0.09% 0.01% 0.01% 4.67%
Aa 0.84% 84.86% 8.73% 0.52% 0.06% 0.04% 0.00% 4.94%
A 0,04% 1.53% 86.93% 6.20% 0.55% 0.11% 0.04% 4.59%
Baa 0.01% 0.05% 3.69% 84.92% 4.25% 0.89% 0.22% 5.96%
Ba 0.01% 0.05% 0.30% 5.26% 74.14% 8.16% 0.62% 11.45%
B 0.01% 0.03% 0.11% 0.32% 4.37% 73.73% 6.55% 14.87%
Caa-C 0,00% 0.02% 0.02% 0.12% 0.41% 7.37% 62.89% 29.16%
Source: Moody's Investor Service Credit Ratings Performance Measurement Statistics,
March 2010
This matrix shows rating changes that took place during
2009. According to numbers on the first line below the cap-
tion, 86.42% of corporate issuers that were rated "Aaa" at the
beginning of 2009 retained that rating during 2009, but 7.79%
of them were downgraded to "Aa," 1% to "A," and 0.03% to
"Baa," and so on. The symbol "CaaC" includes three different
rating grades: "Caa," "Ca," and "C." According to Moody's defi-
nitions, companies rated "Caa" are judged to be of poor stand-
ing and subject to very high credit risk. Companies rated "Ca"
are highly speculative and are likely in, or very near, default,
with some prospects of principal and interest recovery. Com-
panies rated "C" are typically in default, with little prospect for
recovery of principal or interest.57 The transition matrix shows
that 0.01% of companies rated "Aaa" at the beginning of 2009
migrated to the lowest tier of "Caa-C." Moody's uses "WR" to
stand for "withdrawal of rating." Withdrawal typically occurs
when Moody's feels that it lacks adequate information to assess
the issuer's credit risk.
58
56. Moody's Investors Service, available at http://v3.moodys.com/Publish
inglmages/MCO/FormNRSRO_2009_Public-sent.pdf.
57. See Moody's Investor Service, Moody's Rating Symbols & Definitions,
Updated Reference Guide (Moody's Investor Service, New York, N.Y.), June
2009, at 8, available at http://v3.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodys
RatingsAttachments/MoodysRatingsSymbolsand%20Definitions.pdf.
58. Id. at 50.
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The transition matrix reveals important information
about Moody's rating performance. First, it shows the default
ratio by each rating category. A high default ratio, particularly
a high default ratio for issuers that had a rating of "Baa" or
above (i.e., investment grades), suggests that the original rat-
ing was likely inadequate, since an investment grade should be
assigned only to issuers which the rating agency believes are of
moderate to minimum credit risk.59 Second, the transition ma-
trix shows the ratio of "fallen angels," which refers to issuers
that have been downgraded from an investment grade to a
non-investment grade. An abnormally high percentage of
"fallen angels" raises a red flag about the appropriateness of
the original investment grade rating.60 Third, the transition
matrix shows the frequency of rating changes, which is the
number of issuers that experienced rating changes during a
given time period. While rating agencies should maintain
timely updates on their ratings based on new developments in
the rated entities' credit risk, unstable ratings, evidenced by an
abnormally high rating change ratio, undermine the predic-
tive power of the original ratings.
2. The "Ten-Percent Rating Sample" and "Complete Record Since
June 2007"
In the February 2009 Adopting Release, 61 the SEC
adopted paragraph (d) of Rule 17g-2 to require each credit
rating agency registered as an NRSRO to make publicly availa-
ble on its website rating action histories for ten percent of out-
standing issuer-paid credit ratings for each rating class for
which the agency has issued 500 or more issuer-paid credit rat-
ings. 62 The "Ten-Percent Rating Sample" must be selected ran-
domly and disclosed to the public no later than six months
after an included rating action is taken. Credit rating agencies
must indicate on Form NRSRO the web address where the
data file can be accessed. Moreover, the rating history data
must be maintained in XBRL format so users can search dy-
59. MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE, supra note 57.
60. See STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 537 (McGraw-Hill,
5th ed. 1999).
61. Feb. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 5.
62. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2(d) (2009).
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namically and analyze the data.63 The purpose of the "Ten-
Percent Rating Sample" is to allow financial market partici-
pants to perform statistical analyses of NRSRO performance
with respect to issuer-paid credit ratings. 64 The compliance
date for the new disclosure requirement was April 10, 2009.65
In the Nov. 2009 Adopting Release, 66 the rating action
disclosure was further expanded by a new provision which re-
quires the inclusion of historical ratings information for all
NRSRO credit ratings initially determined on or after June 26,
2007 (the effective date of the Credit Rating Agency Reform
Act), whether a rating is issuer-paid, subscriber-paid, or unso-
licited.67 For ratings that are issuer-paid, the disclosure must
be made no more than twelve months after a rating action is
taken. For ratings that are not issuer-paid, the disclosure must
be made no more than twenty-four months after the rating ac-
tion is taken.68 The delay in disclosure is to accommodate the
"concerns raised by NRSROs regarding their ability to derive
revenue from granting market participants access to their
credit ratings and downloads of their credit ratings."
69
The purposes of the rating action disclosures are twofold:
(1) to facilitate ratings-by-ratings comparisons across credit rat-
ing agencies, and (2) to generate data that can be used to de-
velop independent statistical analyses of the overall perform-
ance of a credit rating agency in total and for each class and
subclass of credit ratings. The ability of the investing public to
compare performances of credit rating agencies will foster ac-
countability, transparency, and competition in the credit rat-
ing industry.7
0
As of August 1, 2010, every credit rating agency that has
registered as an NRSRO is in full compliance with the above
disclosure requirements. While the disclosures vary in content
and format, they all contain information on the identity of the
issuer, the date of the rating action, the broad rating sector
(i.e. whether the rating belongs to the corporate, sovereign, or
63. SeeJune 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 27.
64. See Feb. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6, at 8.
65. See id. at 1.
66. Nov. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6, at 63, 833-34.
67. 17 C.F.R. §240.17g-2(a) (2) (iv), (d)(3) (2010).
68. Id.
69. See Nov. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 63, 835.
70. See id. at 63, 836-37.
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asset-backed securities category), the type of rating action (i.e.,
whether the rating action is an upgrade, downgrade, confirma-
tion of the prior rating, new rating, or withdrawal of ratings,
etc.), and the current rating. Some, but not all, rating agencies
provide information on the debt instrument subject to rating
(i.e., maturity date, coupon rates, etc).71
3. The Problem of Inconsistency
In order to compare performance across different rating
entities, there must be a high level of consistency in the data in
terms of key elements, such as rating symbols and their defini-
tions, as well as rating sector categorizations, and issuer indus-
try specifications. However, the current regulation has not im-
posed any requirement of consistency that must be observed
by all reporting NRSROs. As a result, the reported data are
substantially inconsistent, which makes the industry-wide com-
parison of credit rating agencies' performance measurements
a difficult and tedious task.
First, inconsistency exists even in the broad rating sector
categorizations. For example, Standard & Poor's Ten-Percent
Rating Sample72 divides ratings into five sectors: "Corporate
Issuers," "Financial Institutions," "Insurance Companies," "Is-
suers of Asset-Backed Securities," and "Issuers of Government
Securities." "Financial Institutions" include banks, investment
banks and other financial service companies, while "Corporate
Issuers" include industrial corporations. However, Rating & In-
vestment Information, Inc. ("R&I") divides the reported data
into "Corporate Issuers," "Issuers of Government Securities,"
"Municipal Securities," and "Foreign Government Securities."
Financial institutions are included in the "Corporate Issuers"
group. 73 Similarly, A.M. Best Company ("A.M. Best") divides
data into "Insurance Companies" and "Corporate Issuers," but
the issuers included in its "Corporate Issuers" group are mostly
insurance companies, which would have been included in the
71. See, e.g., Moody's Corp. Sample Ratings Data, The 10% Rule, http://
v3.moodys.com/Pages/regOO1004.aspx (click to download the CSV format
file; registration is required) (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
72. Standard & Poor's Rating History Information, http://www.standard
andpoors.com/prot/ratings/history-samples/en/us/ (last visited Oct. 5,
2010).
73. See Rating and Investment Information 2008, Inc., NRSRO, http://
www.r-i.co.jp/eng/regulatory-affair/nrsro.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
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"Insurance Companies" group by other agencies.7 4 An exam-
ple in this regard is Unum Group, Inc., which is a Fortune 500
company and a market leader in disability, long-term care, and
life insurance sectors. This company is included in the "Corpo-
rate Issuers" group in A.M. Best's Ten-Percent Rating Sample,
but the same company is included in Standard & Poor's sam-
ple for "Insurance Companies."
75
Second, most rating agencies do not provide information
on a debt issuer's industry sector. Even for those agencies that
provide such information, the industry designations are incon-
sistent. For example,Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd. ('ICR")
lists telecommunication companies such as Japan Telecom
Co., LTD under "Information & Communication," while Stan-
dard & Poor's uses "Telecommunications" to describe the
same field. Similarly, JCR uses "Electric Power & Gas" to de-
scribe the industry group for companies like Chubu Gas Com-
pany,76 while Standard & Poor's uses the term "Regulated
T&D" for companies in the same field (e.g. Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co.). Examples like these are plentiful. A person inter-
ested in calculating and comparing credit rating agencies' per-
formance for any particular industry must first obtain industry
group information from other sources and manually input the
information into the data set, or to the extent such informa-
tion is already provided in the data, sort out the inconsisten-
cies in industry specifications among millions of rows of data
entries before he can proceed with any statistical analysis.
Third, credit rating agencies have not disclosed the geo-
graphical locations of their rated issuers. A person interested
in comparing credit rating agencies' performance for any par-
ticular geographical region (US, Europe, Canada, Japan, etc).
must first ascertain the issuer's country of origin from other
74. A.M. Best, (Form NRSRO) Exhibit 1, available at http://www.ambest
.com/nrsro/formnrso.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
75. Compare A.M. Best, Corporate Issuers, http://www3.ambest.com/
ambv/nrsro/contract.aspx?fn=Rulel 7g_2dCorporateIssuersRatingsV2.
XML (last visited Oct. 5, 2010) (listing Unum Group), with Standard &
Poor's Rating History Information, supra note 72 (listing Unum under "In-
surance Companies").
76. Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd.,JCR Ratings History Sample, http:/
/www.jcr.co.jp/english/ratingactions/index.html?PHPSESSID=c971 babefc4
13667a90424725d2a1537 (click to download the ZIP file) (last visited Oct. 5,
2010).
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sources and manually input the information into the data set.
This lack of information about the issuer's geographical loca-
tion greatly magnifies the difficulty in any geographic compar-
ison.
Fourth, inconsistencies exist in credit rating symbols both
across different agencies and within a single agency. For exam-
ple, Moody's uses "C" and "Ca" to indicate that the issuer is
"typically" or "likely" in default on its long-term corporate
debts, 77 and switches to the symbol "D" to indicate the occur-
rence of default for Corporate Family Rating. 78 In contrast,
other agencies typically use "D" to stand for the actual occur-
rence of default. 79 There is also ambiguity in the definitions
of rating symbols. For example, a company receiving a "C" or
"Ca" from Moody's is said to be "typically" or "likely" in default
but has it indeed defaulted, or is it merely highly likely to
default? The uncertain default status makes it difficult to cal-
culate performance measurements such as the default ratio for
Moody's - a person must manually search the rating an-
nouncements and the news on the rated issuer surrounding
the rating announcement dates in order to obtain the exact
default status of the issuer.
In sum, comparing performances of credit rating agencies
appears to be an arduous and time-consuming process in light
of the inconsistencies in the reported data. Will the intended
audience of these disclosures (namely debt issuers and inves-
tors) judiciously sift out those inconsistencies from literally
millions of rows of data entries in order to identify a top per-
former for their next rating assignment, or, perhaps inhibited
by the anticipated difficulty in this task, will they simply make
77. Moody's Rating Symbols & Definitions, 8 (June 2009), http://
v3.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodysRatingsAttachments/Moodys
RatingsSymbolsand%20Definitions.pdf.
78. "Moody's Corporate Family Ratings are opinions of a corporate fam-
ily's ability to honor all of its financial obligations and is assigned to a corpo-
rate family as if it had a single class of debt and a single consolidated legal
entity structure." Moody's Rating Symbols & Definitions, Moody's Investors Ser-
vice, 18 (June 2009), http://v3.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodys
RatingsAttachments/MoodysRatingsSymbolsand%20Definitions.pdf.
79. See, e.g., Understanding Standard & Poor's Rating Definitions, STAN-
DARD & POOR'S, 10, 12 (June 3, 2009), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/
spf/pdf/fixedincome/UnderstandingRating.Definitions.pdf.
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an easy pick from among those agencies with an established
name recognition in the relevant sectors?
C. Effectiveness of Credit Rating Agencies' Disclosures - a
Cognitive Science and Consumer Choice Perspective
Cognitive science postulates that people are information
processors through their perceptual system, motor system, and
cognitive system.80 The cognitive system is often discussed in
terms of two types of memories: working memory and long-
term memory. Working memory contains the information
under current consideration, while long-term memory stores a
person's knowledge accumulated over years. 81 Working mem-
ory is also called the "short-term memory" because items of
information in working memory can be lost in twenty to thirty
seconds if not actively rehearsed.8 2 Moreover, working mem-
ory is limited in capacity in that only a few items (four to five,
according to some research) of information can be considered
at any one time.83 This limited capacity may cause information
overload. 8
4
Long-term memory's capacity is generally thought of as
infinite in the sense that, for all practical purposes, there are
no limits to the amount of information that can be stored
there (and subsequently retrieved in the form of "memory").85
However, not all information that is placed in working mem-
ory is transferred to or stored in long-term memory. In part
this is due to the amount of time - an estimate of seven
seconds - that it takes to transfer an item of information to
long-term memory.86 The inability of a person to transfer in-
formation from working memory to long-term memory in
80. "The perceptual system consists of sensors (receptors), such as the
eyes and ears and associated buffer memories. It translates sensations from
the physical world (i.e., visual or aural input) into symbolic code that can be
processed more fully by the cognitive system. The motor system, on the
other hand, translates thought into action by activating patterns of voluntary
muscles."James R. Bettman,John W. Payne & Richard Staelin, Cognitive Con-
siderations in Designing Effective Labels for Presenting Risk Information, 5 J. PUB.
POL'V & MARKETING 1, 87 (1986).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 9.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 10.
86. Id.
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tasks performed in a short time span makes the former all the
more important in information processing.
8v
The limited capacity in working memory translates di-
recdy to people's limited capacity for processing complex in-
formation in a short time span. This conclusion is contrary to
the typical assumptions that human beings are extensive infor-
mation processors and that providing more information is al-
ways helpful. 88 Indeed, merely making information available
without providing a practical way through which information
may be readily comprehended and used is not sufficient. "In
general, information must be both available and easily
processable to be utilized."8
One important implication of the limited working mem-
ory capacity is that people use heuristics (or cues) to process
complex information, especially when they are subject to time
pressure.90 Heuristics are procedures for systematically simpli-
fying the search through the available information about a
problem. Heuristics function by disregarding some of the
available information. 91 Multiple heuristics may be available to
facilitate choice-making. In such situations, the extent to
which a particular heuristic is utilized depends on its perceived
reliability (or diagnostic power) in discriminating the quality
of choice alternatives relative to other heuristics.9 2 Heuristics
can be divided into two types based on how easy their valence
can be changed: high scope and low scope. High-scope heuris-
tics evolve over time and thus cannot be changed instantane-
ously (for example, brand name and reputation), whereas low-
scope heuristics are transient and changeable in a short time
(for example, price). Given that high-scope heuristics are es-
tablished over time and cannot be changed easily, they are
87. Id.
88. Id. at 12-14.
89. Id.
90. See Niraj Dawar & Philip Parker, Marketing Universals: Consumers' Use of
Brand Name, Price, Physical Appearance, and Retailer Reputation as Signals of Prod-
uct Quality, J. MARKETING, Apr. 1994, at 81, 83. See also Akshay R. Rao & Kent
B. Monroe, The Effect of Price, Brand Name, and Store Name on Buyers' Perceptions
of Product Quality: An Integrative Review, 26J. MARKETING RES. 351, 352 (1989).
91. Bettman, Payne & Staelin, supra note 80, at 109.
92. See Devavrat Purohit &Joydeep Srivastava, Effect of Manufacturer Repu-
tation, Retailer Reputation, and Product Warranty on ConsumerJudgments of Prod-
uct Quality: A Cue Diagnosticity Framework, 10 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 123-34
(2001).
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perceived to have more diagnostic power for the quality of
choice alternatives than low-scope heuristics. Indeed, prior re-
search suggests that a product's brand-name (or its producer's
reputation) is among the most important heuristics used by
consumers in assessing a product's quality.
9 3
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model, 94 persua-
sion can occur through two routes: central or peripheral. The
"central route" is a thoughtful route in which the audience ex-
amines all of the information presented in an attempt to evalu-
ate a proposal.95 The audience's thinking level or "elabora-
tion" is high. The "peripheral route" is a less thoughtful route
in which the audience does not engage in extensive cognitive
processing of information and its attitudes are informed pri-
marily by the use of simple cues or heuristics. The audience's
"elaboration" level is low.9 6
The audience's "elaboration" level is determined by its
motivation and ability to process the information presented.
When either motivation or ability is absent, persuasion can
only be achieved through the peripheral route by some simple
heuristics or cues because "under low elaboration the audi-
ence does not scrutinize the message-relevant information for
its substantive merits. ' 97 Thus, "any evaluation that is formed is
likely to result from simple associations or inference processes
that do not require much cognitive effort."98 When such sim-
ple cues are not readily available, even a strong and compel-
ling message may fail to influence the audience's attitude and
behavior.99
93. Id. at 125. See also William B. Dodd, Kent B. Monroe & Dhruv Grewal,
Effect of Price, Brand, and Store Information on Buyers' Product Evaluations, 28 J.
MARKETING RES. 307 (1991).
94. The model was developed by Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo
as an organizing framework for understanding attitude change and persua-
sion. See RicHARD E. PEnNv &JoHN- T. CAcioppo, ArITUDES AND PERSUASION:
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 252 (1981); see also WILLIAM C.
BROWN, RICHARD E. PETrY & JOHN T. CAcIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND PER-
SUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE (1986).
95. Derek D. Rucker & Richard E. Petty, Increasing the Effectiveness of Com-
munications to Consumers: Recommendations Based on Elaboration Likelihood and
Attitude Certainty Perspectives, J. PuB. POL'Y & MARKETING 39, 40 (2006).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 44.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 45.
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When processing information, people choose strategies
based on the following four goals: (1) maximizing the accu-
racy of the choice, (2) minimizing the cognitive effort re-
quired to make the choice, (3) minimizing the experience of
negative emotion when making the choice, and (4) maximiz-
ing the ease ofjustifying the choice.100 The first two goals trig-
ger a cognitive cost-benefit balancing that helps explain why
people tend to process complex information based on simpli-
fying heuristics. 01 When decisions need to be evaluated by
other people, the interplay of the last three goals helps explain
why decision-makers tend to defer to the preferences of peo-
ple to whom they are accountable. Such a strategy is easier to
justify and it minimizes cognitive costs and negative emotions
that often arise from knowingly making choices that run con-
trary to other people's preferences.
10 2
According to the above cognitive science findings, there
are a few notable deficiencies in credit rating agencies' per-
formance disclosures under the current regulation. First, the
disclosures fail to provide simplifying heuristics that help view-
ers of the disclosures in processing the information embedded
in the performance data. The disclosures come in the form of
transition matrices and records of rating actions that are not
immediately comparable and require extensive manual treat-
ment to discover inconsistencies. The disclosures do not juxta-
pose completed performance measurements of different agen-
cies, therefore, viewers cannot quickly comprehend the rela-
tive performances of rating agencies simply through
examining the disclosure documents. The disclosures have
merely made data available, but have failed to make them eas-
ily processable. As a result, the brand name of a credit rating
agency remains the most convenient (and powerful) heuristic
that debt issuers and investors can rely on in inferring an
agency's quality.
Second, a high "elaboration" level necessary for process-
ing complex information requires a strong motivation on the
part of the processor. However, there is nothing in the current
100. SeeJames R. Bettman, Mary Frances Luce & John W. Payne, Construc-
tive Consumer Choice Preferences, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 187, 193 (1998).
101. See Don N. Kleinmuntz & David A. Schkade, Information Displays and
Decision Processes, 4 PSYCHOL. Sci. 221, 224 (1993).
102. See Bettman, Luce & Payne, supra note 100, at 197-98.
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regulation that motivates debt issuers to scrutinize the per-
formance disclosures and select credit rating agencies based
on their performance records. Merit-based selection is not
mandated in statutes, SEC rules or case law. Although corpo-
rate directors and officers owe shareholders a fiduciary duty to
manage corporate affairs with reasonable diligence, they have
significant leeway under the business judgment rule and are
liable only for self-dealing or gross negligence) 0 3 To date
there has been no case law suggesting that directors and of-
ficers violate the business judgment rule if they select credit
rating agencies based on factors other than the latter's per-
formance measurements.
Third, a debt issuer's selection of rating agencies is evalu-
ated, if not directly dictated, by investors in debt securities. In-
vestors typically expect credit ratings to come from a brand
name in the subject-rating sector and view any deviation from
the prevalent norm with suspicion. 10 4 Deferring to investors'
expectation seems to be a strategy that is easiest to justify. Un-
fortunately, the current regulation has not made any perform-
ance-based choice similarly easy to justify to debt investors.
The disclosures do not provide performance measurements of
credit rating agencies in an easily comparable form, so debt
issuers cannot point to an authoritative ranking of the histori-
cal performance of credit rating agencies and say: "I choose
Agency Unknown over Moody's because it has the best records
in the past three years."
The deficiencies in credit rating agencies' disclosures cast
doubt on their effectiveness in conveying information on rat-
ing qualities and influencing debt issuers' behavior in ways in-
tended by the SEC. The next section empirically tests the ef-
fectiveness of the disclosures by examining how performance
statistics have indeed impacted debt issuers' selection of credit
rating agencies in the past decade.
103. See, e.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988).
104. See Fabian Dittrich, The Credit Rating Industry: Competition and
Regulation, 75-76 (July 13, 2007) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Uni-
versity of Cologne), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract991821 (discussing
further reasons for the two-rating norm).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal and Law & Business
[Vol. 7:47




A. Description of Data
This study examines the relationship between the market
share of credit rating agencies with their past performance to
see whether performance statistics have influenced debt issu-
ers' selection of credit rating agencies. If the answer is yes,
then the performance disclosures required under the current
regulation can function as an effective reputational sanction
for agencies with inferior performances and as an aid for less-
established rating agencies to break the entry barrier by estab-
lishing their own superior performance records. Ratings of
registered NRSROs can roughly be classified into three main
categories: corporate securities and issuer ratings, sovereign
debt ratings, and structured finance ratings for asset-backed
securities. 1 5 Ratings for each of these categories can be fur-
ther divided into long-term, short-term, and outlook ratings.
This study focuses on long-term corporate ratings, which in-
clude long-term ratings for industrial corporations, financial
institutions and insurance companies.
The long-term corporate rating sector is selected for study
in this paper because it is "mature" in the sense that there are
few fundamental differences in the methodologies used by dif-
ferent credit rating agencies, and so variations in their market
share cannot be attributed to debt issuers' preference of one
rating methodology over another. In addition, because the
long-term corporate rating market is dominated by a few agen-
cies, it provides a good setting for studying the effect of per-
formance statistics on market share when the entry barrier is
high.
Although Form NRSRO requires rating agencies to dis-
close performance statistics for the past one-, three- and ten-
year periods, this study examines only the impacts of one- and
three-year performance statistics. This is because long-term rat-
ings for a corporation often exist for less than ten years due to
corporate dissolutions or ratings that were discontinued due
to lack of sufficient information for the assessment of the debt
105. See Application for Registration as a Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organization (Form NRSRO), Item 6.A., available at http://
www.sec.gov/about/forms/formnrsro.pdf.
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issuer's credit risk. When this smaller sample base is further
divided based on sectors and industries, there is often limited
rating data available for a meaningful calculation of ten-year
performance statistics.
10 6
This study uses market share and performance data of
seven credit rating agencies that are currently registered as
NRSROs. These agencies are: Moody's, Standard & Poor's,
Fitch, DBRS, A.M. Best, JCR, and R&I.10 7 For any specified
time period, the market share of a credit rating agency in any
rating sector is defined as the number of issuer-paid new rat-
ings assigned by the rating agency divided by the total number
of new ratings of all rating agencies in the sector. The number
of new ratings is obtained from the "Ten-Percent Rating Sam-
ple" made available to the public under Exchange Act Rule
17g-2. Except for Moody's, the rating sample of every agency
has specified whether a rating action is an upgrade, down-
grade, confirmation, or new rating. Moody's sample provides a
unique ID for all rating actions on the same debt issues of an
issuer. The occurrence of new ratings and the dates of their
assignment can be identified by sorting the data in chronologi-
106. For a discussion of the lack of meaningful ten-year performance sta-
tistics, see, for example, DBRS, Inc., 2009 Annual Certification (Form NR-
SRO), 21 (2010), available at http://www.dbrs.com/research/215034/
exhibit-i .pdf.
107. Three other agencies - Realpoint LLC, LACE Financial, and Egan-
Jones - are also registered NRSROs, but the first agency specializes in rating
structured finance products (a sector that is beyond the scope of this paper),
while the last two do not charge issuers for their ratings: they rely instead on
fees paid by subscribers to their ratings to support their business operations.
See Notice of Order Granting Registration of Realpoint LLC as a Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,361-62 (june 23,
2008); Notice of Order Granting Registration of Lace Financial Corp. as a
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 73 Fed. Reg. 8,720-21
(Feb. 11, 2008); Notice of Order Granting Registration of Egan-Jones Rating
Company to Add Two Additional Classes of Credit Ratings, 73 Fed. Reg.
75,144 (Dec. 10 2008), Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organiza-
tions ("NRSROs"), Commission Orders Granting NRSRO Registration, avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency.htm. For a dis-
cussion of Realpoint's rating sectors, see Realpoint, https://www.real
point.com/RPLogin.aspx (last visited Aug. 17, 2010). For a discussion of
LACE Financial's business model, see Overview, LACE FINANCIAL CoRP.,
http://www.lacefinancial.com/Out/about/index.aspx (last visited Aug. 17,
2010). For a discussion of Egan-Jones' business model, see Egan-Jones Rat-
ings Co. (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.egan-jones.com.
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cal order and taking count of the first appearance of a new ID
entry.
Performance statistics of credit rating agencies are calcu-
lated based on a complete record of rating actions maintained
by Bloomberg, whose records can be searched by rating sector,
rating type (i.e., long-term, short-term or outlook), rating
date, and the issuer's industry and country origin. In addition
to the above searchable items, the Bloomberg data also show
the agency's current and previous rating, and can be
downloaded into Excel.
B. The Market Share of Rating Agencies
Each credit rating agency subject to this study has regis-
tered as an NRSRO for ratings on corporate issuers, financial
institutions, and insurance companies.108 The agencies' mar-
ket shares in these sectors are shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4 be-
low.
Table 2 shows the number of ratings outstanding as of the
end of 2009 as reported in each rating agency's Form NR-
SRO.109 The numbers include both issuer-paid and unsolicited
ratings. They provide a snapshot of market share allocation in
rating industrial corporations, financial institutions and insur-
ance companies.
108. The rating agencies' respective copies of Form NRSRO can be viewed
at: Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC, Application for Registration
as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (Form NRSRO)
(Sep. 22, 2010), available at Standard & Poor's, http://www.standardand
poors.com/ratings/form-nrsro/en/us; Moody's, Moody's Investor Services,
Inc., Form NRSRO (Oct. 1, 2009), available at http://v3.moodys.com/
Publishinglmages/MCO/nrsroapplication.pdf; DBRS, Fitch, Inc., Form NR-
SRO (Mar. 30, 2010) available at http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/
nrsro/nav/NRSROannualcertification_2010.pdf; A.M. Best, DBRS Lim-
ited, Form NRSRO (Sep. 3, 2010), available atJCR, http://www.dbrs.com/
research/215033/formNRSROjcr.co.jp/english/nrsro/pdf/Update_2010
0809.pdf; A.M. Best Company, Inc., Form NRSRO (Mar. 29, 2010), available
at R&I, http://www.ambest.comri.co.jp/eng/regulatory-affair/nrsro/Form
_NRSRO_AnnualCertificationMarch_2010.pdf.html; Japan Credit Rating
Agency, Ltd., Form NRSRO (Aug. 4, 2010), available at http://
www.jcr.co.jp/english/nrsro/pdf/ Update_20100809.pdf; Rating and Invest-
ment Information, Inc., Form NRSRO (June 1, 2010), available at http://
www.r-i.co.jp/eng/regulatory-affair/nrsro.html.
109. Id.
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TABLE 2 NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING RATINGS
AT THE END OF 2009
Industrial Financial Insurance
Corporation Institution Company
# of Market # of Market # of Market
Ratings Share Ratings Share Ratings Share
Standard & Poor's 41,400 43.2% 52,500 24.0% 8,600 35.5%
Moody's 31,008 32.3% 76,801 35.1% 5,455 22.5%
Fitch 12,613 13.1% 72,311 33.0% 4,599 19.0%
DBRS 5,350 5.6% 16,630 7.6% 120 0.5%
A.M. Best 2,246 2.3% 3 0.0% 5,364 22.2%
JCR 518 0.5% 156 0.1% 31 0.1%
R&I 2,807 2.9% 495 0.2% 46 0.2%
Total 95,942 218,896 24,215
Table 3, Panel A shows the allocation of issuer-paid rat-
ings for the period of 2000-2009. The "# of Ratings" listed in
the Panel are smaller in scale than those in Table 2 for a num-
ber of reasons. First, the numbers in Panel A are obtained
from the Ten-Percent Rating Sample reported by the rating
agencies under Exchange Act Rule 17 g-2. Thus, they reflect
only ten percent of the actual number of new ratings. Second,
the numbers in Panel A include only issuer-paid ratings while
the numbers in Table 2 include both issuer-paid and unsolic-
ited ratings. Third, the numbers in Panel A include only long-
term ratings, while the numbers in Table 2 include all ratings
(i.e., long-term, short-term, and outlook).
Debt issuers often have multiple issuances that require
credit ratings. The numbers in Panel A are issue-based such
that each debt issue of the same issuer takes one count. How-
ever, if two rating agencies each rated 100 debt issues in any
given time period, and one agency's ratings were mostly for
multiple issues of a small number of issuers while the other
agency's ratings were mostly for different issuers, the two agen-
cies' market positions should be different. Therefore, Table 3,
Panel B further shows market share in terms of the number of
rated issuers as opposed to issues. Tables 2 and 3 paint a
highly consistent picture of how market share is allocated
among the listed rating agencies.
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TABLE 3 MARKET SHARE ALLOCATION DURING 2000 - 2009
Panel A Number of Issuer-Paid Ratings During 2000 - 2009*
Industrial Financial Insurance
Corporation Institution Company
# of Market # of Market # of Market
Ratings Share Ratings Share Ratings Share
Standard & Poor's 3,205 42.7% 4,759 23.7% 493 25.1%
Moody's 2,334 31.1% 8,935 44.5% 510 25.9%
Fitch 1,269 16.9% 5,759 28.7% 165 8.4%
DBRS 211 2.8% 593 3.0% 0 0.0%
A.M. Best 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 798 40.6%
JCR 266 3.5% 28 0.1% 0 0.0%
R&I 223 3.0% 17 0.1% 0 0.0%
Total 7,508 20,091 1,966
Panel B Number of Issuers Rated During 2000-2009*
Industrial Financial Insurance
Corporation Institution Company
# of Market # of Market # of Market
Ratings Share Ratings Share Ratings Share
Standard & Poor's 1,550 39.3% 501 18.3% 239 24.5%
Moody's 1,495 37.9% 1,435 52.4% 244 25.0%
Fitch 650 16.5% 626 22.9% 71 7.3%
DBRS 74 1.9% 164 6.0% 0 0.0%
A.M. Best 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 423 43.3%
JCR 59 1.5% 5 0.2% 0 0.0%
R&I 117 3.0% 8 0.3% 0 0.0%
Total 3,945 2,739 977
* Based on the Ten-Percent Rating Sample reported by each rating agency pursuant
to Exchange Act Rule 17g-2.
Market Share in Industrial Corporate Ratings:
Standard & Poor's and Moody's are dominating long-term
industrial corporate ratings. Standard & Poor's market share,
whether issue or issuer-based, is about 40%, while Moody's is-
sue-based market share is about 30% and issuer-based market
share is close to 40%. Fitch trails both with a market share of
about 13-16%.
DBRS is also a full-service rating agency. Formed in 1976,
it is known as a leading rating agency in Canada, but it has an
eye toward strengthening its position in the US and European
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markets. 110 It has established branch offices in New York and
Chicago, and has registered with regulatory authorities in Ca-
nada, the US, and Europe.11 DBRS's market share in the in-
dustrial corporate ratings is a fraction of that of the two domi-
nant companies in the field: it held a slight 5.6% share of out-
standing ratings at the end of 2009, and less than 3% of issue-
based new ratings and less than 2% of issuer-based new ratings
during 2000-2009.
A.M. Best is a boutique rating agency that specializes in
insurance company ratings. Although it reported 2,246 "cor-
porate" ratings outstanding as of the end of 2009, the subjects
of these ratings were all insurance companies or debts issued
by insurance companies. 112 This is also the case with A.M.
Best's "corporate issuer" ratings reported in its Ten-Percent
Rating Sample. 113 Such ratings would have been categorized
as insurance company ratings by other agencies."l 4 For consis-
tency in the definition of rating sectors used in this study, in-
surance companies are removed from A.M. Best's "corporate"
rating category and included in the "insurance" rating cate-
gory. This results in an entry of "0" for the number of indus-
trial corporate ratings in Table 3.
JCR and R&I are both based in Japan. They jointly held
less than 7% of all issue-based new ratings and less than 5% of
issuer-based new ratings during 2000 - 2009. Moreover, issuers
included in their Ten-Percent Rating Samples were all Japa-
nese companies.
110. For a discussion of DBRS's strategic plan, see Walter Schroeder,
Chairman's Message, DBRS, INC., http://www.dbrs.com/about/chairmans
Message (last visited Aug. 17, 2010).
111. For a discussion of DBRS's rating business, see DBRS Products and Ser-
vices, DBRS, INC., http://www.dbrs.com/about/products (last visited Aug.
17, 2010).
112. This information is based on an examination of the complete rating
actions since June 26, 2007 reported by A.M. Best under Exchange Act Rule
17g-2(d) (3), and an examination of the complete rating actions recorded in
Bloomberg for the relevant period.
113. This information is based on an examination of A.M. Best's Ten Per-
cent Rating Sample for the time period of 2000-2009.
114. This information is based on an examination of the Ten Percent Rat-
ing Samples of all rating agencies included in this study.
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Market Share in Financial Institution Ratings:
Moody's is the market leader in this sector, accounting for
35% of outstanding ratings at the end of 2009, and 44% issue-
based and 52% issuer-based new ratings during 2000-2009.
Fitch ranks second with a market share of 33%, 28% and 23%,
respectively, in the above measures. Standard & Poor's takes
the third place with a market share ranging from 20% to 25%.
Jointly these "Big Three" agencies have more than 90% of the
market share in financial institution ratings. DBRS' share is in-
substantial at 6-8%. A.M. Best and the two Japanese rating
agencies are inactive in this field.
Market Share in Insurance Company Ratings:
A.M. Best's reputation as an agency specializing in rating
the insurance industry is consistent with the data in this field.
Its 40% share of new long-term ratings (issue as well as issuer-
based) assigned during 2000-2009 attests to its dominance.
A.M. Best's market share based on the 2009 Form NRSRO
trails behind that of Standard & Poor's, but that gap would
close substantially if the 2,246 ratings mis-categorized as "cor-
porate" were included in the insurance sector: A.M. Best's
share would have been 28.7% while Standard & Poor's would
have been 32%.
Based on the numbers in Table 3, Panels A and B,
Moody's ties with Standard & Poor's in long-term insurance
company ratings with each agency taking about 25% of the
market share. Fitch's position is relatively insubstantial at 7-
8%. DBRS, JCR and R&I have shown little rating activities in
this field.
Table 4 compares the market share allocation during the
three-year period before, and the three-year period after, the
enactment of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006.
The enactment of this statute and the occurrence of the finan-
cial crisis in the ensuing years have lead to a wide publicity of
the problems in the credit rating industry. Therefore, it is at
least possible that the investment community has paid more
attention in the post-2006 period to the performance record
of credit rating agencies when deciding which agency should
rate a particular debt issue. The purpose of Table 4 is to ex-
amine whether the post-2006 period has seen any shift in the
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market share allocation away from the pattern that was prima-
rily built on brand name recognitions in previous years.
TABLE 4 COMPARISON OF MARKET SHARE BEFORE AND AFTER
THE 2006 CREDIT RATING AGENCY REFORM ACT












































































Although there are some re-allocations of market share
among rating agencies in the post-2006 period, the basic allo-
cation pattern appears to be the same with the "Big Three"
agencies still dominating industrial corporate and financial in-
stitution ratings and A.M. Best leading the insurance rating
sector. To ascertain whether the re-allocations in the post-2006
period are statistically significant, a percentage of change is
calculated by dividing the change in a rating agency's market
share by its pre-2006 market share. The sum of this percentage
across all rating agencies is examined against a distribution
bootstrapped from the values of the observed percentage
changes. The sum of the observed percentage changes for
each rating sector falls in the region of the 50th percentile of
the bootstrapped distribution, suggesting a lack of statistical
significance in the changes in market share allocations in the
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post-2006 era. This result holds whether market share is calcu-
lated based on the number of issuer-paid ratings or based on
the number of issuers rated.115 The lack of significant change
in market share allocations is also confirmed in a Kendall's
Tau test.l a6
C. The Performance Records
1. Performance Measures and Their Calculations
The current regulation requires each credit rating agency
registered as an NRSRO to disclose its rating performance in
terms of historical default rates and rating transitions. Per-
formance statistics embedded in a transition matrix include
the default ratio, the ratio of "fallen angels," and rating stabil-
ity measured by the frequency of rating changes, especially the
frequency of large rating changes. Some rating agencies also
use the average time to default, the cumulative accuracy pro-
file (or Gini coefficients) 117 and the accuracy ratio1 18 to mea-
l15. The conserve space, the ranges of the mid 50th, 60th, 70th, 80th, and
90th percentiles of the bootstrapped distribution are not included in this
paper, but the author will make this information available upon request.
116. The coefficients in the test are all positive and significantly different
from zero. For market share based on the number of ratings, the Kendall's
tau coefficients for the industrial corporate, financial institution and insur-
ance company ratings are: 0.81, 0.90, and 0.89, respectively. For market
share based on the number of issuers rated, the Kendall's tau coefficients for
the industrial corporate, financial institution and insurance company ratings
are: 0.81, 1.00, and 0.89, respectively. These coefficients are significantly dif-
ferent zero with p-values ranging from 0.002 to 0.01. For a detailed discus-
sion of the Kendall's tau test, see generally M.G. Kendall, A New Measure of
Rank Correlation, 30 BIOMETRICA, 81-93 (1938).
117. See, e.g., Default, Transition, and Recovery: 2009 Annual Global Corporate
Default Study and Rating Transitions, STANDARD & POOR'S RATING SERVICES,
Table 1 (2010), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/
articles/en/us/?assetD=1245207201119. The cumulative accuracy profile is
constructed by plotting, for each rating category, the proportion of defaults
accounted for by firms with the same or a lower rating against the propor-
tion of all firms with the same or a lower rating.
118. See, e.g., Corporate Rating Accuracy Improves, Volatility and Default Rates
Decline, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, (Aug. 4, 2010), available at
v3.moodys.com/ratings-process/About-Credit-Policy/001001 +Moody's+
accuracyratio&cd=4&h=en&ct-clnk&gl=us. The accuracy ratio is the ratio of
the area between the cumulative accuracy profile curve and the 45-degree
line to the maximum possible area above the 45-degree line, which is one-
half.
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sure rating performances, but the default, "fallen angels" and
stability ratios are universally accepted as important measures
by all rating agencies in assessing their own performance.
Therefore, those parameters are used in evaluating rating
agencies' performance in this study.
The default ratio is the ratio of the total number of de-
faults to the total number of ratings that a rating agency has
assigned during a specified time period. The "fallen angels"
ratio is the total number of ratings that were of investment
grade at the start of the period but migrated to a non-invest-
ment grade or a default rating by the end of the period, di-
vided by the total number of investment grade ratings that the
rating agency has assigned during the period. The rating
change ratio is the total number of rating changes divided by
the total number of ratings assigned during a specified period.
The large rating change ratio is the total number of large rat-
ing changes divided by the total number of ratings assigned
during a specified period. In this regard, the number of large
rating changes is defined as the number of ratings that have
experienced changes of three or more notches during an an-
nual period.' 19
In this study, performance statistics are calculated for
each year, and for each moving three years, during the period
of 2000-2009. This corresponds to the one-year and three-year
performance disclosure requirements in the current regula-
tion. If past performance matters at all in a debt issuer's selec-
tion of credit rating agencies, then many, if not all, of these
statistics should have a significant explanatory power with re-
spect to market shares of the rating agencies.
2. Summary Performance Statistics
Summary Performance Statistics of Industrial Corporate Ratings-
The summary statistics of the default ratio, "fallen angels"
ratio, the rating change ratio, and the large rating change ra-
tio for industrial corporate ratings are reported in Table 5.
119. For a discussion of special comment, rating performance measure-
ments, see Richard Cantor & Christopher Mann, Measuring the Performance of
Corporate Bond Ratings, MooDY's INVESTOR'S SERVICE (2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=996025.
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TABLE 5 SUMMARY PERFORMANCE STATISTICS OF
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATE RATINGS
"Fallen Rating Change Large Rating
Default Ratio Angels" Ratio Ratio Change Ratio
One- Three- One- Three- One- Three- One- Three-
year years year years year years year years
Standard & Poor's
- Mean 0.05 0.06
- Medium 0.05 0.05
- Standard Deviation 0.04 0.04
Moody's
- Mean 0.06 0.09
- Medium 0.04 0.07
- Standard Deviation 0.04 0.06
Fitch
- Mean 0.01 0.02
- Medium 0.01 0.01
- Standard Deviation 0.02 0.02
DBRS
- Mean 0.02 0.02
- Medium 0.01 0.01
- Standard Deviation 0.02 0.01
A.M. Best
- Mean N/A N/A
- Medium N/A N/A
- Standard Deviation N/A N/A
JCR
- Mean 0.01 0.005
- Medium 0.01 0.005
- Standard Deviation 0.01 0.003
R&I
- Mean 0.00 0.00
- Medium 0.00 0.00
- Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00
0.07 0.10 1.23 1.81 0.05 0.06
0.06 0.09 1.28 1.88 0.03 0.06
0.03 0.03 0.33 0.34 0.03 0.03
0.07 0.10 1.11 1.60 0.04 0.05
0.06 0.08 1.15 1.58 0.03 0.05
0.03 0.03 0.21 0.22 0.02 0.03
0.07 0.09 0.97 1.33 0.04 0.05
0.05 0.08 0.94 1.34 0.03 0.04
0.04 0.04 0.28 0.32 0.03 0.03
0.03 0.04 0.81 1.00 0.02 0.02
0.02 0.04 0.92 0.93 0.02 0.02
0.03 0.02 0.47 0.46 0.03 0.02
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A







0.85 1.07 0.01 0.01
0.88 1.10 0.01 0.01
0.20 0.11 0.01 0.01
0.46 0.84 0.01 0.01
0.36 0.82 0.003 0.01
0.26 0.14 0.01 0.01
In terms of the default ratio, Moody's and Standard &
Poor's stand out as the worst performers. Moody's annual de-
fault ratio has a mean of 0.06, followed by Standard & Poor's
(0.05), DBRS (0.02), Fitch (0.01), JCR (0.009), and R&I (0).
The moving three-year default ratio follows the same pattern;
these differences are statistically significant. 120
120. For the annual default ratio, the t-test for the difference in the mean
between Moody's and DBRS, Moody's and Fitch, Moody's and JCR, Moody's
and R&I, shows a p-value of 0.001, 0.0004, <.0001, and <.0001, respectively.
The p-values for the difference in the mean between Standard & Poor's and
the above entities (other than Moody's) are 0.17, 0.08, 0.03, and 0.004, re-
spectively. For the moving three-year default ratio, the p-values are <.0001
across the board between Moody's and other agencies (except for Standard
& Poor's). The p-values for the difference in the mean between Standard &
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In terms of the "fallen angels" ratio, Moody's, Standard &
Poor's, and Fitch also have an inferior record compared to the
smaller rating agencies. This record holds true whether the
ratio is calculated annually or on a moving three-year basis.
Most of the differences are statistically significant.
121
In terms of the rating change ratio, the "Big Three" agen-
cies have higher ratios than their less-established peers, under-
lining their inferiority in maintaining rating stability. Most of
the differences between the smaller agencies and Moody's and
Standard & Poor's, respectively, are statistically significant.
122
The differences between Fitch and DBRS, and between Fitch
and JCR, are insignificant, but the differences between Fitch
and R&I are significant) 23 The large rating change ratio fol-
lows a similar pattern, and most of the differences between the
"Big Three" agencies and smaller agencies are statistically sig-
nificant.124
Poor's and the above entities (other than Moody's) are 0.01, 0.01, 0.0005,
and 0.0002, respectively. There is no significant difference in the mean de-
fault ratio between Moody's and Standard & Poor's.
121. For the annual ratio, the t-tests for the differences in the mean be-
tween Moody's and DBRS, Moody's and R&I, Standard & Poor's and DBRS,
Standard & Poor's and R&I, and Fitch and R&I have p-values of 0.06, 0.03,
0.07, 0.004, and 0.08, respectively. For the moving three-year ratio, the p-
values are 0.01, 0.05, 0.01, 0.003, 0.3, 0.01, 0.03, 0.17, and 0.04, respectively,
for the differences between Moody's and DBRS, Moody's and JCR, Moody's
and R&I, Standard & Poor's and DBRS, Standard & Poor's and JCR, Stan-
dard & Poor's and R&I, Fitch and DBRS, Fitch andJCR, and Fitch and R&I.
122. For the annual rating change ratio, the p-values in the t-test for any
difference in the mean between Moody's and DBRS, JCR, and R&I are 0.12,
0.23, and <.0001, respectively. The p-values for the difference in the mean
between Standard & Poor's and each of the above smaller agencies are 0.01,
0.02, and <.0001, respectively. For the moving three-year ratio, the p-values
for the difference between Moody's and the above smaller agencies are
0.0005, 0.0003, and <.0001, respectively. The p-values for the difference be-
tween Standard & Poor's and the above smaller agencies are all less than
0.0001.
123. For the annual ratio, the p-values of the t-test for the difference in the
mean between Fitch and each of DBRS, JCR, and R&I are: 0.74, 0.89, and
0.0009, respectively. For the moving three-year ratio, the p-values are: 0.15,
0.41, and 0.001, respectively.
124. For the annual large rating change ratio, the p-values in the t-test for
any difference in the mean between Moody's and DBRS, JCR, and R&I are
0.64, 0.11, and 0.01, respectively. The p-values for the difference in the mean
between Standard & Poor's and each of the above smaller agencies are 0.09,
0.005, and 0.0003, respectively. The p-values for the difference in the mean
between Fitch and each of the above smaller agencies are 0.57, 0.09, and
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Recall from the above discussion that Standard & Poor's
and Moody's dominate the long-term industrial corporate rat-
ing sector with a combined share of about 75% of the total
new ratings in the past decade, and the aggregate market
share of smaller agencies is less than 10%. This allocation of
market share is disproportionate to the ranking of the agen-
cies' performance. It could be argued that because JCR and
R&I are boutique firms specializing in rating Japanese compa-
nies, they could not compete with firms such as Moody's or
Standard & Poor's on a global basis. DBRS, on the other hand,
is a full-service firm with a presence in the US, Europe and
Canada. Its slight 3% market share certainly cannot be justi-
fied by its performance. Moreover, Fitch ties with Standard &
Poor's and Moody's in all performance measures and is an es-
tablished global agency. However, Fitch's market share of less
than 17% pales in comparison with Standard & Poor's 40%
and Moody's 30%.
Summary Performance Statistics of Financial Institution Ratings.
Summary performance statistics of financial institution
ratings are reported in Table 6. In terms of the default ratio,
the "Big Three" agencies again have underperformed the
smaller agencies. The mean ratios forJCR, and R&I are either
zero or near zero while the mean ratios for the "Big Three"
range between 0.01 and 0.02. These differences are statistically
significant. 125 DBRS also has lower mean default ratios than
the "Big Three," although the differences are insignificant for
0.01, respectively. For the moving three-year ratio, the p-values for the differ-
ence between Moody's and the above smaller agencies are 0.07, 0.002, and
0.001, respectively. The p-values for the difference between Standard &
Poor's and the above smaller agencies are 0.04, <.0001, and <.0001, respec-
tively. The p-values for the difference in the mean between Fitch and each of
the above smaller agencies are 0.07, 0.002, and 0.0004, respectively.
125. For the annual default ratio, the p-values in the t-test for the differ-
ence in the mean between Moody's and A.M. Best, JCR, and R&I, respec-
tively, are 0.01, 0.02, and 0.01. The p-values for the difference between Stan-
dard & Poor's and the above smaller agencies are 0.003, 0.01, and 0.004,
respectively. The p-values for the difference between Fitch and the above
smaller agencies are 0.43, 0.84, and 0.54, respectively. For the moving three-
year default ratio, the p-values for the difference in the mean between
Moody's and A.M. Best, JCR, and R&I, respectively, are <.0001, 0.0003, and
<.0001. The p-values for the difference between Standard & Poor's and the
above smaller agencies are <.0001, 0.001, and <.0001, respectively. The p-
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the annual ratio and for the three-year ratio as between DBRS
and Fitch. 1
26
TABLE 6 SUMMARY PERFORMANCE STATISTICS OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION RATINGS
"Fallen Rating Large Rating
Angels" Change Change
Default Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio
One- Three- One- Three- One- Three- One- Three-
year years year years year years year years
Standard & Poor's
- Mean 0.02 0.02
- Medium 0.01 0.02
- Standard Deviation 0.02 0.01
Moody's
- Mean 0.02 0.02
- Medium 0.01 0.02
- Standard Deviation 0.01 0.01
Fitch
- Mean 0.008 0.01
- Medium 0.003 0.01
- Standard Deviation 0.01 0.01
DBRS
- Mean 0.005 0.001
- Medium 0.00 0.00
- Standard Deviation 0.01 0.004
A.M. Best
- Mean N/A N/A
- Medium N/A N/A
- Standard Deviation N/A N/A
JCR
- Mean 0.002 0.004
- Medium 0.00 0.00
- Standard Deviation 0.01 0.01
R&I
- Mean 0.00 0.00
- Medium 0.00 0.00
- Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00
0.04 0.03 1.14 1.38
0.03 0.03 1.13 1.48
0.03 0.02 0.35 0.20
0.04 0.04 1.15 1.51
0.03 0.03 1.12 1.54
0.03 0.02 0.23 0.17
0.03 0.02 0.93 1.09
0.02 0.02 0.89 1.00
0.04 0.01 0.37 0.30
0.02 0.01 0.73 0.75
0.01 0.01 0.64 0.67
0.03 0.01 0.52 0.21
N/A N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.05 0.05 0.90 1.35
0.04 0.05 0.88 1.27
0.06 0.02 0.36 0.35
0.02 0.02 0.61 1.21
0.01 0.01 0.48 1.18
0.05 0.03 0.35 0.35
In terms of the "fallen angels" ratio, DBRS and R&I have
lower (and thus superior) ratios than all of the "Big Three"
agencies, although significance tests show that the differences
values for the difference between Fitch and the above smaller agencies are
0.07, 0.77, and 0.09, respectively.
126. The p-values in the t-test for any difference in the mean annual ratio
between DBRS and Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch, respectively, are
0.12, 0.16 and 1.00, respectively. The p-value for the difference in the mean
of the three-year ratios between DBRS and Moody's and between DBRS and
Standard & Poor's are less than 0.0001.
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are insignificant.127 In terms of the rating change ratio, DBRS
again outperforms Moody's and Standard & Poor's, and their
differences are statistically significant.128 Fitch also has lower
ratios than Moody's and Standard & Poor's, but their differ-
ences are mostly insignificant except for the three-year ratio
between Fitch and Moody's. 129 There is no significant differ-
ence between the ratios of Moody's and those of Standard &
Poor's.130 In terms of the large rating change ratio, the differ-
ences among rating agencies are mostly insignificant.13 1
Earlier discussions on market share allocations in the fi-
nancial institution rating sector have shown that Moody's,
Standard & Poor's, and Fitch account for 44.5%, 23.7%, and
28% of the new ratings in the past decade, and account for
52.4%, 18.3%, and 22.9% of the number of issuers for which
new ratings were assigned. Yet Fitch outperforms Moody's in
terms of the three-year default ratio and three-year rating sta-
bility, and has other performance parameters that are not sta-
tistically different from Moody's. Moreover, Moody's and Stan-
dard & Poor's have comparable performance records, but
Moody's market share is about twice that of Standard & Poor's.
DBRS has superior records than Moody's in most performance
measures, yet DBRS's market share is no more than 8%.
Summary Performance Statistics of Insurance Company Ratings.
Table 7 reports the summary statistics of rating agencies'
performance in insurance company ratings. A.M Best is the
leader in this sector with about 40% of the market share. It has
outperformed the other agencies in terms of the rating
127. For the annual "fallen angels" ratio, the p-values of the t-tests for any
difference in the mean range from 0.97 to 1.00. For the moving three-year
ratio, the p-values range from 0.27 to 1.00.
128. For the annual rating change ratio, the p-values are 0.09 in both t-
tests. For the moving three-year ratio, the p-values were <.0001 and 0.0001.
129. For the annual rating change ratio, the p-values are 0.74 and 0.75.
For the moving three-year ratio, the p-values are 0.02 and 0.2.
130. The p-values are 1.00 for the annual rating change ratio, and 0.95 for
the moving three-year rating change ratio.
131. For the annual large rating change ratio, the p-values of the t-tests for
any difference in the mean range from 0.60 to 1.00. For the moving three-
year ratio, the p-values of the t-tests for any difference in the mean between
DBRS and Moody's, and between DBRS and R&I are 0.05 and 0.03, respec-
tively. The p-values of the t-tests for any difference among other rating agen-
cies range from 0.15 to 1.00.
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change ratio, but its large rating change ratio is indistinguish-
able statistically from that of most of the other agencies.
132
Similarly, its "fallen angels" ratio and default ratio are not sta-
tistically different from those of the others.1
33
TABLE 7 SUMMARY PERFORMANCE STATISTICS OF
INSURANCE COMPANY RATINGS
"Fallen Rating
Angels" Change Large Rating
Default Ratio Ratio Ratio Change Ratio
One- Three- One- Three- One- Three- One- Three-




























- Standard Deviation 0.03
0.02 0.06 0.06 1.13 1.50 0.04 0.04
0.02 0.06 0.05 1.19 1.54 0.02 0.04
0.01 0.03 0.03 0.46 0.42 0.05 0.02
0.02 0.04 0.04 1.18 1.70 0.04 0.06
0.02 0.03 0.05 1.19 1.71 0.03 0.06
0.01 0.03 0.01 0.35 0.34 0.04 0.03
0.01 0.03 0.04 0.92 1.19 0.03 0.04
0.01 0.02 0.04 1.00 1.28 0.02 0.04
0.01 0.03 0.02 0.49 0.44 0.04 0.02
0.00 0.08 0.04 0.91 1.23 0.01 0.03
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78 1.47 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.16 0.05 0.57 0.41 0.03 0.04
0.07 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.27 0.005 0.004
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.0005
0.09 0.02 0.01 0.35 0.37 0.01 0.01
0.06 0.05 0.06 0.93 1.21 0.02 0.04
0.04 0.00 0.05 1.04 1.21 0.00 0.028
0.07 0.09 0.06 0.36 0.43 0.06 0.05
0.04 0.03 0.05 0.50 1.15 0.02 0.05
0.00 0.00 0.05 0.46 0.97 0.00 0.04
0.06 0.06 0.05 0.26 0.44 0.03 0.04
132. For the annual large rating change ratio, the p-values of the t-tests for
any difference between A.M. Best and other agencies range from 0.19 to
1.00. For the moving three-year ratios, the p-values of the t-tests for any dif-
ference between A.M. Best and Moody's, R&I, and S&P are 0.003, 0.02, and
0.098, respectively. The p-values of the t-tests for any difference among other
agencies range from 0.15 to 1.00.
133. For the annual rating change ratio, the p-values of the t-tests for any
difference between A.M. Best and DBRS, Fitch, JCR, Moody's, R&I, and
Standard & Poor's are 0.01, 0.002, 0.0016, <.0001, 0.72, and <.0001, respec-
tively. For the moving three-year ratio, the p-values are 0.0002, <.0001,
<.0001, <.0001, 0.0003, and <.0001.
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Moody's and Standard & Poor's each has about 25% of
market share. Their rating performances in all measures are
statistically indifferent.134 Fitch is not significantly different
from Moody's and Standard & Poor's in terms of the default
ratio, the "fallen angel" ratio, and the large rating change ra-
tio.135 Fitch's moving three-year rating change ratio is actually
better than that of Moody's, 13 6 yet Fitch's market share of in-
surance company ratings is a slight 8.4%. More interestingly,
DBRS's performance is not statistically different from that of
the "Big Three" agencies,1 37 yet its market share is negligible.
D. The Correlation Between Market Share and Performance
Statistics
Table 8 reports two correlation measures between credit
rating agencies' market share and performance statistics: (1)
Pearson correlation 138 between rating agencies' number of is-
suer-paid new ratings in a year and their performance statistics
in the previous year, and (2) Pearson correlation between rat-
ing agencies' number of issuer-paid new ratings in a year and
their performance statistics in the three years immediately
before. Because low values of the performance parameters are
signs of superior rating performance, a negative and signifi-
cant correlation between market share and performance statis-
tics should exist if historical performance has played a part in
debt issuers' selection of rating agencies.
But the data shows a contrary relationship. The correla-
tion is statistically significant for all performance measures in
industrial corporate ratings, and for most measures (except
the "fallen angels" ratio"), in financial institution ratings. How-
134. The p-values of t-tests of the difference in the mean range from 0.92
to 1.00.
135. The p-values of t-tests for any difference in the mean is 1.00 for de-
fault ratios, between 0.90 and 1.00 for "fallen angel" ratios, and between 0.78
and 1.00 for the large rating change ratio.
136. The p-value of the t-test was 0.01.
137. The t-tests show p-values ranging from 0.26 to 1.00.
138. The correlation between two variables is a number between -1 and +1
that measures the degree to which the variables are related. The Pearson
correlation is the most common measure of such a relationship. It is ob-
tained by dividing the covariance of the two variables by the product of their
standard deviations. For more discussion on the Pearson correlation, see AL-
LEN L. EDWARDS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR REGRESSION AND CORRELATION
33-46 (Richard C. Atkinson et. al. eds., 1976).
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ever, the correlation is positive, suggesting that rating agencies
with higher ratios (hence inferior performance) are associated
with bigger market shares! The significance in the correlation
disappears in insurance company ratings except for the "fallen
angels."
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** Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level.
Though these correlations may seem awkward, they are
consistent with the market share data and the summary per-
formance statistics shown in previous tables. Those tables show
inferior records of Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and to a great
extent, Fitch, relative to their less-established peers in almost
every performance measure, and yet they dominate industrial
corporate and financial institution ratings with a combined
market share of more than 90% in each sector. For insurance
company ratings, A.M. Best accounts for about 40% of the
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market share, and Moody's and Standard & Poor's each ac-
count for about 25% of the market share. Although A.M. Best
has the lowest mean "fallen angels" ratio, Moody's and Stan-
dard & Poor's have higher ratios than minor players such as
Fitch and Ratings & Investment. As a result, the correlation is
only significant at the 10% level as opposed to the 5% level.
1. Multivariate Regressions
The Regression Models.
This section reports the result of multivariate regressions
of market share on lagged performance statistics after control-
ling for factors such as the geographical origins of debt issuers
and rating agencies' pre-existing market positions in a given
rating sector.
In Table 9, Panel A, the dependent variable is a rating
agency's annual market share in each rating sector examined
in this study. This cross-sectional regression is based on a sam-
ple of 154 annual market share observations pooled from all
seven rating agencies across all rating sectors (i.e., industrial
corporate, financial institution, and insurance company rat-
ings) during the period of 2000-2009. Independent perform-
ance variables include a rating agency's default ratio, "fallen
angels" ratio, the rating change ratio and the large rating
change ratio in the previous year and the previous three years.
A rating agency's market share in the previous three years139 is
also included as an independent variable to control for the
agency's pre-existing market position (and also debt issuer's
exhibited preferences in selecting rating agencies) in a given
rating sector.140
In Table 9, Panel B, the dependent variable is a rating
agency's market share in all new ratings for debt issuers that
are not in the agency's home region (the "Non-Domestic Is-
suer Ratings"). For example, if Moody's assigned 1,000 new
139. The three-year market share is calculated as the ratio of a rating
agency's new ratings in a particular rating sector in a three-year period to the
total new ratings assigned by all agencies during the same period.
140. Ideally, the regression model should control for variations in the rat-
ing fees charged by different rating agencies. However, such information is
proprietary in nature and is not made available to the public. Therefore, the
regression model and its results build on the assumption that all credit rat-
ing agencies are competitive in their ratings fees.
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ratings for industrial corporate issuers in 2008, and 500 of the
issuers were US companies, and if the aggregate number of
new ratings in this field was 5,000, and 2,000 of these ratings
were for US companies, Moody's market share in "Non-Do-
mestic Issuer Ratings" in the industrial corporate sector for
2008 would be 16.7% (i.e., (1,000 - 500)/(5,000 - 2,000)).
A regression based on rating agencies' market shares in
"Non-Domestic Issuer Ratings" accounts for the possibility that
issuers' selection of a rating agency is influenced by the
agency's geographical convenience and cultural affinity with
the issuer. For example, DBRS is headquartered in Canada
and is a leading agency in that market. Variations in Canadian
companies' debt issuance from year to year may have contrib-
uted to the variations in DBRS's market share. Such a concern
exists for other agencies as well: Moody's and Standard &
Poor's are more likely to be preferred by US issuers, Fitch by
European issuers, A. M. Best by US insurance issuers, and JCR
and R&I by Japanese issuers.
In Table 9, Panel C, the regression uses the same model
as in Panel B except that the data sample is reduced to cover
the period of 2007 - 2009.141 As discussed earlier, this period
follows the enactment of the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Re-
form Act and coincides with the occurrence of a world-wide
financial crisis. As a result, this period exhibits a higher level of
public awareness of the problems of credit rating agencies.
The purpose of the regression shown in Panel C is to examine
whether the performance record of a credit rating agency has
affected its market share when there is at least a strong reason
for debt issuers and the investment community to pay atten-
tion to the performance record.
Table 10 differs from Table 9 in that the independent
performance variables are a rating agency's performance rank-
ing scores in the previous year and the previous three years.
These scores are calculated by sorting the agencies' perform-
ance statistics for each parameter in ascending order and as-
signing a score of 1 for the worse performer and a score of 2
for the second-worst performer, and so on so forth until the
maximum number of 7 is reached. In any given year, the
scores of an agency for all annul performance measures in a
particular rating sector are added to obtain an overall annual-
141. There are 48 observations in this reduced sample.
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performance ranking score of the agency for the rating sector
in that year. For example, if in 2008 Moody's is the worst per-
former among all rating agencies in industrial corporate rat-
ings in terms of the annual default ratio, the "fallen angel"
ratio, the rating change ratio, and the large rating change ra-
tio, its annual-performance ranking score for industrial corpo-
rate ratings for the year would be 4 (i.e., 1+1+1+1). The three-
year performance ranking scores are calculated in a similar
way.
Regression Results.
In Table 9, Panel A, the coefficients on most of the lagged
performance measures are statistically insignificant, suggesting
a lack of explanatory power of performance measures on rat-
ing agencies' market shares. The only performance variable
that is significant in this regression is the lagged one-year large
rating change ratio, but the coefficient has a positive sign. The
positive sign highlights a positive relation between market
share and this performance parameter such that higher large
rating change ratios (hence inferior rating stability) are actu-
ally associated with bigger market shares. This result is consis-
tent with the summary statistics on market shares and perform-
ance records discussed in previous sections in that large rating
agencies have dominating market shares despite their inferior
rating stability. The pre-existing market position is the most
significant variable in this regression. This significance sug-
gests that the market share allocation in the credit rating in-
dustry is path-dependant in the sense that rating agencies' pre-
existing market positions determine their respective market
shares for the current period: big agencies that have estab-
lished a dominant position in a rating sector are likely to con-
tinue enjoying their competitive advantage even though their
performance records may lag behind their less-established
peers, whereas small agencies or new entrants to the market
are likely to maintain just an insubstantial share of the busi-
ness even though they have outperformed big agencies in
every major measurement of rating quality. This path depen-
dency is also consistent with the hypothesis that debt issuers
tend to select credit rating agencies based on the latter's name
recognitions.
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TABLE 9 REGRESSION OF MARKET SHARE ON
PERFORMANCE STATISTICS
Panel A Regression of Overall Market Share on Performance Statistics
Standard
Variable Coefficient Error*** t-Value Pr > I t I
Intercept 0.01 0.03 0.19 0.85
Lag One-year Default Ratio 0.06 0.34 0.16 0.87
Lag Three-year Default Ratio 0.15 0.43 0.36 0.72
Lag One-year "Fallen Angels" Ratio -0.33 0.22 -1.49 0.14
Lag Three-year "Fallen Angels" Ratio 0.13 0.26 0.53 0.60
Lag One-year Rating Change Ratio 0.02 0.03 0.56 0.58
Lag Three-year Rating Change Ratio -0.0001 0.03 0.00 0.99
Lag One-year Large Rating Change Ratio 0.84 0.47 1.77 0.08*
Lag Three-year Large Rating Change Ratio -0.41 0.47 -0.87 0.38
Pre-existing Market Position 0.85 0.06 14.19 <.0001**
Adj. R-Sq: 0.76
Panel B Regression of Market Share in Non-Domestic Issuer
Ratings on Performance Statistics
Standard
Variable Coefficient Error*** t-Value Pr> Id
Intercept 0.01 0.02 0.40 0.69
Lag One-year Default Ratio 0.53 0.18 3.00 0.003**
Lag Three-year Default Ratio -0.22 0.18 -1.23 0.22
Lag One-year "Fallen Angels" Ratio -0.30 0.17 -1.78 0.08*
Lag Three-year "Fallen Angels" Ratio 0.21 0.21 1.00 0.32
Lag One-year Rating Change Ratio 0.01 0.03 0.41 0.68
Lag Three-year Rating Change Ratio -0.005 0.03 -0.18 0.86
Lag One-year Large Rating Change Ratio 0.82 0.39 2.08 0.04**
Lag Three-year Large Rating Change Ratio -0.38 0.46 -0.83 0.41
Pre-existing Market Position 0.90 0.06 15.99 <.0001**
Adj. R-Sq: 0.84
Panel C Regression of Market Share in Non-Domestic Issuer
Ratings on Performance Statistics in 2007 - 2009
Standard
Variable Coefficient Error*** I-Value Pr > I td
Intercept 0.03 0.04 0.67 0.51
Lag One-year Default Ratio 0.47 1.62 0.29 0.77
Lag Three-year Default Ratio -0.25 2.46 -0.10 0.92
Lag One-year "Fallen Angels" Ratio -0.69 0.67 -1.02 0.32
Lag Three-year "Fallen Angels" Ratio 0.57 1.03 0.55 0.58
Lag One-year Rating Change Ratio -0.03 0.05 -0.58 0.57
Lag Three-year Rating Change Ratio -0.03 0.06 -0.42 0.67
Lag One-year Large Rating Change Ratio 0.89 0.95 0.94 0.36
Lag Three-year Large Rating Change Ratio 0.15 1.69 0.09 0.93
Pre-existing Market Position 1.08 0.10 11.32 <.0001**
Adj. R-Sq: 0.87
*** Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard error. ** Significant at 5% level. * Significant at
10% level.
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TABLE 10 REGRESSION OF MARKET SHARE
ON PERFORMANCE RANKING
Panel A Regression of Overall Market Share on Performance Ranking
Standard
Coefficient Error*** t-alue Pr> It I
Intercept 0.09 0.03 2.91 0.004
Lag One-year Ranking Score -0.0004 0.002 -0.23 0.82
Lag Three-year Ranking Score -0.004 0.002 -1.88 0.06*
Pre-existing Market Position 0.80 0.06 12.71 <.0001**
Adj. R-Sq: 0.76
Panel B Regression of Market Share in Non-Domestic Issuer
Ratings on Performance Ranking
Standard
Coefficient Error*** -Value Pr> It
Intercept 0.08 0.03 2.63 0.01
Lag One-year Ranking Score -0.002 0.002 -1.23 0.22
Lag Three-year Ranking Score -0.001 0.002 -0.73 0.46
Pre-existing Market Position 0.85 0.06 13.28 <.0001**
Adj. R-Sq: 0.84
Panel C Regression of Market Share in Non-Domestic Issuer
Ratings on Performance Ranking in 2007 - 2009
Standard
Coefficient Error*** t-Value Pr > It I
Intercept -0.01 0.04 -0.24 0.81
Lag One-year Ranking Score 0.001 0.003 0.51 0.61
Lag Three-year Ranking Score -0.001 0.002 -0.42 0.68
Pre-existing Market Position 1.07 0.09 11.22 <.0001'*
Adj. R-Sq: 0.84
*** Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard error. ** Significant at 5% level. * Significant
at 10% level.
The regression based on market share allocations of rat-
ings for non-domestic issuers has revealed similar results. Ta-
ble 9, Panel B shows again that the lagged market share is the
most significant variable in explaining the current period mar-
ket share allocations among credit rating agencies. Although
the default ratio and the large rating change ratio in the previ-
ous year also have significant explanatory power over the cur-
rent-period market share allocation, the signs on their coeffi-
cients are positive, again suggesting that higher ratios (and
thus inferior rating performance) are actually associated with
higher market shares. The lagged one-year "fallen angels" ra-
tio has a negative sign and is significant at 10% level, but the
significance disappears (hence lacks robustness) in regressions
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based on observations in more recent years (see discussions on
Table 9, Panel C below).
14 2
Credit rating agencies' performance records remain irrel-
evant toward their market share allocations in the post-2006
era. Table 9, Panel C shows that none of the performance sta-
tistics has had any effect on credit rating agencies' market
shares in non-domestic issuer ratings. The lagged market share
is again the only significant explanatory variable, highlighting
the importance of credit rating agencies' pre-existing market
positions and name recognitions in debt issuers' selection of
credit rating agencies for the current period. It is interesting
to note the continued irrelevance of performance statistics in a
period of time when debt issuers are fully aware of the quality
problems in the credit rating industry!
The performance ranking of a credit rating agency is also
inconsequential. In Table 10, the coefficients on the rankings
were mostly insignificant, except for the lagged three-year
ranking in Panel A. However, the sign of the coefficient on
this performance variable is negative, meaning that agencies
with higher-ranking scores (hence superior overall perform-
ance) held lower market shares. Recall that the summary per-
formance statistics discussed earlier in this paper have shown
that smaller agencies outperformed the "Big Three" in most
measures of performance. Smaller agencies' ranking scores
are higher but their market shares are lower, and this inequity
is borne out in the form of a negative correlation between
ranking scores and market shares.
The coefficient on the lagged market share is positive and
highly significant in all three panels. This significance suggests
again that an agency's pre-existing market position drives its
market share
In sum, this empirical study has failed to reveal any value
of performance disclosures in shaping market share alloca-
tions for the credit rating industry. Debt issuers have had ac-
cess (at least indirectly through their financial advisors) to a
complete record of rating action data collected by reputable
data vendors such as Bloomberg, and the data is available in
the XBRL or comparable formats for easy downloading into
142. The significance also disappears in a regression based on observa-
tions in 2003 - 2009. The results of this robustness test will be provided to
interested audience upon request.
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popular data processing software, such as Excel. However,
there is no evidence debt issuers have considered ratings agen-
cies' historical performances before making their selections.
Instead, debt issuers appear to be brand conscious and have
exhibited a tendency of selecting ratings agencies based on the
latter's pre-existing market positions and name recognitions.
As a result, top-performing agencies are not rewarded with
higher market shares and under-performing agencies are not
punished with diminished business opportunities. Once a pow-
erful agency has established a strong foothold in the business,
it continues to enjoy a competitive advantage that cannot be
overtaken by new challengers, even when those newcomers
have earned superior performance records. The ability of per-
formance disclosures to sanction or enhance an agency's repu-




The results of this study suggest that when an industry
(such as the credit rating industry) is dominated by brand
names, competing entities in the industry may not be able to
effectively signal the quality of their ratings by disclosing past
performance information in the form of large volumes of non-
standardized data. Such disclosures require extensive process-
ing before being usable as a diagnostic tool for assessing and
comparing the quality of different producers. As a result, such
disclosures are unlikely to alter choice makers' tendency to use
brand names as the heuristic in inferring the quality of com-
peting brands.
How should the current credit rating agency disclosures
be improved? In a seminal paper on how to design product
labels that effectively communicate risk factors to consumers
and allow them to compare risk factors across different prod-
ucts, James Bettman, John Payne, and Richard Staelin dis-
cussed the principles that should guide policy makers in de-
signing disclosure documents so as to best facilitate informed
decisions. 143 These principles are: (1) Reducing the cognitive
effort and/or time needed to locate the externally available
143. Bettman, Payne & Staelin, supra note 80.
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information, retrieve any previously stored information, and
encode the newly provided information; (2) Reducing the cog-
nitive effort and/or time needed to make risk-benefit tradeoffs
within a particular brand or alternative being considered; and
(3) Reducing the cognitive effort and/or time needed to make
comparisons across different brands or alternatives.
144
Based on these principles as well as cognitive science and
consumer choice research findings discussed in the previous
part of this paper, credit rating agency disclosures can be im-
proved in the following ways:
First, Reduce effort in information acquisition through a centralized
data repository.
Under the current regulation, credit rating agencies are
required to disclose historical rating actions on their web-
sites.1 45 Although retrieving such information from individual
websites is not an overbearing task given the near ubiquitous
availability of high speed internet connections, this effort
could be further reduced by requiring all agencies to deposit
rating data at a centralized internet location. With a few clicks,
visitors to the website could locate all agencies that are subject
to the disclosure requirements, any agency's compliance sta-
tus, and the scope of the agency's data coverage in terms of
time span, rating sectors, and data items.
Europe has made more progress in this regard than the
U.S. On April 23, 2009, the European Parliament approved
rules proposed by the Commission of the European Commu-
nities on credit rating agency regulations. The rules include a
mandate to the Committee of European Securities Regulators
("CESR") to create a publicly available central repository for
standardized data on credit ratings and credit rating agencies'
performance so that market participants can make industry-
144. Id. at 14.
145. See Nov. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6, at 67-69.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal and Law & Business
[Vol. 7:47
HeinOnline -- 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 96 2010
PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURES
wide comparisons. 146 Currently, the central repository is in the
connection-testing phase.
147
Second, Reduce effort in information processing through enhanced
standardization.
Cognitive science literature has shown that the acquisition
of new knowledge appears to be greatly facilitated by the exis-
tence of previously acquired relevant knowledge that can be
used to form associations. In this regard, the use of common
formats and concepts in communication materials would facili-
tate a person's ability to successfully encode new information
once the format had been learned through prior experi-
ence. 148
As discussed earlier, there is a substantial degree of incon-
sistency in the performance statistics disclosed by credit rating
agencies in terms of rating sectors, rating grades/notches, rat-
ing symbols, and industry categorizations. These inconsisten-
cies make comparing performance measurements across rat-
ing agencies a tedious and laborious task. On top of these sub-
stantive differences, there are also inconsistencies in data
format, variable names, and data items included in the per-
formance disclosures. For example, Standard & Poor's uses
"Group Name" as the variable name for issuers' industries,149
while JCR uses 'Issuer-Group" for the same purpose.150 DBRS
reports the "Published Date" of its rating actions,151 while JCR
reports the "Rating Effective Date." Such inconsistencies
should be eliminated from future disclosures because they in-
146. See Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on Credit Rating Agencies, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internalmarket/securities/docs/agencies/proposal-en.pdf. See also Press
Release, Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., Commission Adopts Proposal to Regu-
late Credit Rating Agencies (Nov. 12, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1684&format=HTML&
aged=O&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr.
147. See CESR- Information on the Central Repository for Credit Rating Agencies
Applying for Registration in the European Union, WORLDWIDE EXCHANGE INTELLI-
GENCE (Jul. 26, 2010), available at http://www.exchange-handbook.co.uk/
index.cfm?section=news&action=detail&id=91888.
148. See Bettman, Payne & Staelin, supra note 80, at 11.
149. See Standard & Poor's Rating History Information, supra note 72.
150. SeeJCR Ratings History Sample, supra note 76.
151. See Regulatory Affairs, DBRS.coM, http://www.dbrs.com/about/
regulatoryAffairs (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).
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crease viewers' cognitive costs in encoding the new informa-
tion.
Third, Motivate debt issuers to review performance statistics with
scrutiny.
A high cognitive elaboration level requires motivation on
the part of debt issuers to review credit rating agencies' per-
formance statistics with care. To provide such a motivation,
the law could require a debt issuer to discuss, in its debt issu-
ance registrations, 152 the rationales for choosing a particular
credit rating agency for rating the debt by referencing the lat-
ter's performance record. The law should not require the
debt issuer to choose only among certain top-ranked agencies
for the rating, as the issuer may have other compelling con-
cerns (such as conflicts of interest) that make the top perform-
ers unsuitable for the job. However, by requiring debt issuers
to discuss the reasons for choosing a particular rating agency
in light of the agency's performance, the law provides a strong
motivation that has hitherto been missing for debt issuers to
examine credit rating agencies' performance data with careful
scrutiny.
Fourth, Use simplifying heuristics to facilitate in performance
comparison.
The cognitive science findings discussed previously in this
paper suggest that people's working memory has a limited ca-
pacity, and therefore, in order for information to be effectively
processed in tasks of short span, simplifying heuristics should
be used. Cognitive science also suggests that disclosures made
to audiences who lack a strong motivation to process the infor-
mation must take the form of simple cues or associations in
order to be persuasive.153 Moreover, there is evidence that
people tend to process information in the format in which it is
152. According to Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, all public offer-
ings of securities must be registered with the SEC unless they qualify for one
or more exemptions provided in the SEC rules. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15
U.S.C. § 77(d)-(e) (2006).
153. See Rucker & Petty, supra note 95 at 42.
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provided rather than transforming it.154 That means if policy
makers find it desirable for people to choose a product or ser-
vice based on its comparative attributes against similar prod-
ucts or services, they can facilitate the comparison by explicitly
making the comparative information available to decision
makers. 155
In the context of credit rating agency regulations, policy
makers can facilitate comparison across agencies by ranking
the agencies according to their performance measurements. A
classic illustration of the power of ranking in facilitating peo-
ple's decision making was shown in a unit price experiment
performed by Edward Russo. 156 He believed that the normal
unit price displays for products, with separate tags for each
item, were difficult to process when consumers attempted to
make price comparisons. In a field experiment, he provided
consumers with unit price information in the form of a sorted
list, with brands ranked in the order of increasing unit price.
As a result, consumers saved an average of two percent in
purchase prices.157 In a more recent study by Sinn, Milberg,
Epstein, and Goodstein, 158 the researchers showed that when
only brand names and prices were provided to consumers who
were asked to choose among alternative products of similar
functions, consumers preferred brands which were more fa-
miliar over brands which were less familiar. But when addi-
tional information about the relative quality of the alternatives
was presented in the form of a "Consumer Report" type of nu-
merical rating index, the "brand name effect" was diminished
in that consumers preferred the superior albeit less well-
154. See Paul Slovic, From Shakespeare to Simon: Speculations - and Some Evi-
dence - About Man's Ability To Process Information, 12 OR. RES. INST. BULL. 9-
10B (1972).
155. See Bettman, Payne & Staelin, supra note 80 at 14; see also David C.
Houghton, Frank R. Kardes, Anne Mathieu & Itamar Simonson, Correction
Processes in Consumer Choice, 10 MARKETING LETTERS 107 (1999) (showing that
selection bias can be reduced by an explicit statement of the relative posi-
tions of options in a choice set).
156. See Edward Russo, The Value of Unit Price Information, 14J. MARKETING
Rs. 193 (1977).
157. Id.
158. See Francisca Sinn, SandraJ. Milberg, Lenardo D. Epstein & Ronald
C. Goodstein, Compromising the Compromise Effect: Brands Matter, 18 MARKET-
ING LETTERS 223 (2007).
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known brands to the inferior but more familiar brands. 15 9 The
researchers explained this choice preference on the ground
that when product information is available and more diagnos-
tic of the product's quality, consumers' reliance on extrinsic
cues (such as reputation) to make inferences about the quality
of the product is reduced. The researchers concluded, "when
product attributes clearly indicates that one alternative is supe-
rior (or inferior) to others in a set of choices and consumers
use that information to form judgment, the effect of brand
familiarity on choice should be diminished."
1 60
The effect of ranking choice objects on the decision mak-
ing process of financial market investors is well illustrated in a
mutual fund study by Diane Del Guercio and Paula A. Tkac.
161
The study examined how Morningstar 162 ratings affected mu-
tual fund flows. The authors found that Morningstar had sub-
stantial independent influence on the investment allocation de-
cisions of retail mutual fund investors. The mere change in the
discrete rating itself (i.e., the number of stars assigned to a
mutual fund), rather than the change in the underlying per-
formance of the funds, could exert significant influence on
fund flow. The authors documented economically and statisti-
cally significant inflows following rating upgrades and abnor-
mal outflows following rating downgrades.
Ranking can be an important simplifying heuristic to help
debt issuers and investors comprehend credit rating agencies'
performance disclosures more efficiently so that they are more
likely to select rating agencies based on merits. But who can
perform such a ranking function? There is a Morningstar for
the mutual fund industry, but the financial market lacks a
Morningstar for the credit rating industry. The Franken Pro-
posal1 63 advocates the establishment of a board that dispatches
assignments to rating agencies based on their performances,
159. Id at 232.
160. Supra note 158, at 230.
161. See Diane Del Guercio & Paula A. Tkac, Star Power: The Effect of
Morningstar Ratings on Mutual Fund Flows, (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Working Paper No. 15, Aug. 2001), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/
frbatlanta/filelegacydocs/wpOl15.pdf.
162. Morningstar is well known for its analysis and ranking of mutual fund
performances. Information on Morningstar can be found on its Home Page
at http://www.morningstar.com/.
163. Corkery, supra note 9.
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but this proposal builds on the assumption that credit rating
agencies' performance measurements are already calculated
and ranked. There is also a legitimate concern for bureaucracy
associated with a government-sponsored entity allocating rat-
ingjobs based on a pre-determined algorithm. Perhaps a more
plausible approach is to continue relying on market partici-
pants to make their own choices based on their idiosyncratic
needs, but to assist them in this process by providing to them
all relevant information in an easily comprehensible and usa-
ble form. Thus, the Franken Proposal should be modified in a
way such that the primary function of its board would be not
to allocate rating jobs for the credit rating industry, but to
closely monitor and rank the performances of its players and
make this information freely accessible to the investment com-
munity. A Morningstar that truly rates the rating agencies
seems not too bad an idea!
V.
CONCLUSION
Conflicts of interest are believed to have caused the opti-
mistic credit ratings of the risky investments whose collapse
triggered the current economic recession. To combat conflicts
of interest in the credit rating industry, Congress enacted the
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, and under the
guidelines of this statute the SEC has proscribed a series of
rules that delineate the current framework of credit rating
agency regulation.
One important component of the credit rating agency
regulation is the requirement that credit rating agencies dis-
close statistics that measure the accuracy of their ratings and
their historical rating actions. Performance statistics are com-
piled in the form of rating transitions and default rates, while
historical rating actions are in the XBRL format, so they can
be downloaded into data processing software to facilitate in-
depth analyses and industry-wide comparisons by debt issuers
and the public.
The SEC intends to achieve two goals through the per-
formance disclosure requirements: (1) to inflict reputational
damage on credit rating agencies whose ratings are driven by
conflicts of interest, and (2) to promote competition by giving
new entrants to the credit rating industry an opportunity to
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build their track records and compete against brand name
agencies, such as Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch.
However, the performance disclosures have notable defi-
ciencies, putting them at odds with cognitive science research
on effective communication in two key respects. First, they lack
in standardization, so a person interested in comparing the
performance of different rating agencies must first go through
a laborious process of manually filtering out inconsistencies in
the data. Second, the performance measurements must be ex-
trapolated from raw data entries in the historical rating action
files given that the current disclosures do not provide compar-
ative information. These shortfalls have made the debt issuer's
task of selecting a credit rating agency based on its compara-
tive performance standing much more arduous.
Due to these shortfalls, and in light of cognitive science
and consumer choice research findings on how human beings
react to complex information, there is a legitimate doubt as to
whether the current performance disclosures can achieve the
goals intended by the SEC. The anticipated difficulty in
processing the disclosure materials may be so high as to cause
debt issuers to forego altogether a performance comparison
when selecting a credit rating agency and to simply pick an
agency that has established name recognition in the relevant
rating sector.
This paper empirically tests whether credit rating agen-
cies' historical performance measurements have had any influ-
ence on their market share in terms of the number of issuer-
paid ratings they have assigned. Although credit rating agen-
cies were not required to disclose their performance statistics
until 2007, data items that are disclosed under the current reg-
ulation have long been collected by data vendors and made
available to debt issuers through the subscription to such data
by the issuers' financial advisors. Therefore, by examining the
past relationship between credit rating agencies' market share
with their performance measurements calculated from data
items that are required to be disclosed under the current regu-
lation, one can predict the likely effect of the current disclo-
sure requirements in guiding debt issuers toward selecting a
credit rating agency based on the latter's performance record.
This study is based on a sample of issuer-paid ratings and
rating actions for seven credit rating agencies currently regis-
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tered as NRSROs. The time period spans 2000-2009, and the
rating sectors examined in the study include industrial corpo-
rate, financial institutions and insurance company ratings. The
default ratio, "fallen angels" ratio, rating change ratio, and
large rating change ratio are used to measure rating agencies'
performance. The market share of credit rating agencies in
each year of the sample period is examined against the agen-
cies' performance measurements in the previous year and the
previous three years. The study shows that smaller rating agen-
cies outperformed the three biggest agencies (i.e., Moody's,
Standard & Poor's, and Fitch) in most performance measures
during the sample period, and yet the biggest three agencies
still controlled the lion's share of the market in each rating
sector subject to examination. Multivariate regressions show
that the most important factor that has been driving the allo-
cation of market share among credit rating agencies is an
agency's pre-existing market position in a particular rating sec-
tor. In sum, debt issuers have been selecting rating agencies
based on the latter's market reputation rather than past per-
formance.
This empirical result is consistent with predictions based
on cognitive science findings, which suggest that information
that is difficult to process tends to be ignored by its viewer and
that simplifying heuristics are needed for consumers to com-
pare products of similar functions. Based on cognitive science
findings, as well as literature on consumer choices and fund
flows of mutual funds, this paper discusses how current disclo-
sures can be improved to communicate more effectively to
debt issuers and to the investing public the accuracy of com-
peting agencies' previous ratings. Specifically, this paper rec-
ommends that the SEC follow Europe's lead in establishing a
central credit rating data repository; that it impose standardi-
zation requirements in disclosure materials; and that it estab-
lish an entity to perform the function that Morningstar is per-
forming for the mutual fund industry, i.e. monitoring and
ranking the performance of competing entities in the industry
and making this information available to the public. Establish-
ing an entity that functions as a rater of the rating agencies is
more plausible than establishing a rating board to dispatch rat-
ing assignments under the Franken Proposal164 (now tempora-
164. See id.
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rily set aside by Congress pending further investigations). The
former approach assists debt issuers in assessing the quality of
credit rating agencies by providing them with relevant infor-
mation, allowing them to make the ultimate selection based
on their idiosyncratic needs, while the latter approach imposes
the will of a government-sponsored entity upon them.
The results of this study apply to other industries (such as
auditing) that are just as entrenched with brand-name domi-
nation as the credit rating industry. For such industries, disclo-
sures in the form of large volumes of non-standardized and
unprocessed data do not effectively communicate the quality
of competing agencies and cannot overcome the tendency of
their customers to allocate business opportunities based on an
agency's market position.
The importance of the results of this study extends be-
yond the border of the credit rating industry. The SEC has
taken major initiatives in recent years to replace the traditional
text-based financial reporting and disclosures with electronic
filings using interactive data in the XBRL format. Such an ini-
tiative is seen in the disclosures of credit rating agencies, mu-
tual funds, financial institutions and public companies that file
periodic reports under the Exchange Act. The goals of these
enhanced reporting requirements are to allow investors to
search and analyze financial information and compare finan-
cial and business performances across companies, reporting
periods, and industries. While electronic filings using data in
the XBRL format are a major improvement over the static text-
based filings, the results of this paper suggest that merely pro-
viding information in the enhanced format may still be insuffi-
cient to achieve the goals intended for this regulatory change.
It is imperative for policy makers to keep in mind the special
characteristics of a regulated industry when they design its dis-
closure system so that information is not only made available
to the intended users, but is also made comprehensible to
them with a minimum effort. After all, as former SEC Chair-
man Arthur Levitt put it, "disclosure is not disclosure if it
doesn't communicate. 165
165. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Fulfilling the
Promise of Disclosure (Jul. 23, 1997) (transcript available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1997/spchl7l.txt).
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